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Summary
Commentators have asserted that “the existence of a genuine medical need constitutes a 
moral claim on those equipped to help.” However, this professional duty is sharply 
limited by the fact that resources are not available to help all the world’s patients with 
each of their problems. At some point, boundaries are drawn implicitly and by force; 
these boundaries can exacerbate inequalities and injustices, or they can contribute to 
making the medical system more fair for everyone it serves. To achieve a more just result, 
distributive justice must be employed, but any systematic way of allocating resources 
depends on being able to define who belongs to a public and thus deserves treatment, as 
well as what any minimum basic right to treatment should entail. By examining closely a 
case of an adolescent undocumented immigrant who traveled from her home country 
explicitly for treatment of a fast-growing tumor, we will explore a variety of ethical 
concerns related to this dilemma in its historical and political context. Finally, a 
pragmatic hospital-based policy to guide microallocation of expensive charity care will 
be proposed in hopes of seeking a reasonably fair process to adjudicate this increasingly 
common dilemma of politics, economics, and professional ethics.
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I .  INTRODUCTION
1. MEDICINE, MIGRATION, AND MORAL COMMUNITIES
 The subject of this thesis—whether and how to provide medical treatment for 
non-citizen patients who require expensive hospital care but who lack funds and 
insurance to cover these services—is a dilemma of global proportions. The number of 
persons implicated in this problem is huge: of the 304 million people surveyed in the 
2010 U.S. Census, about 7.1% of the population, or 21.6 million people, reported 
themselves to be noncitizens—or, in the language of American federal law, “aliens.”1 
This figure includes each of the 11.2 million undocumented immigrants estimated to be 
living in the U.S in 2010.2 Furthermore, human migration is a phenomenon as old as 
society itself. In the United States alone, it is a core feature of our collective history and 
ethos, and immigrant communities remain a major influence on American social, cultural, 
and economic realities today, despite the hostility often on display in our national 
conversations about immigration.3
 Most noncitizens lack eligibility for public health insurance based on criteria set 
forth in federal healthcare policy, leading to inequities of healthcare access that are 
unexplained by any factor.4 This norm has left states, localities, hospitals, and providers 
themselves to render responsibility for these persons’ care, deciding in non-emergent 
cases whether or not to provide expensive, potentially life-saving treatment at their 
discretion, with a lack of professional guidelines about how to make these monumental 
judgments.5 
 Instead of consensus, there exists deeply-felt sentiment on both sides of this issue. 
Despite numerous studies documenting how illegal immigrants underuse health services 
compared with socio-economically alike legal residents or citizens,6 these individuals 
have become, or are thought to be, significant economic burdens to the localities where 
they live and/or seek care.7 For those politically opposed to immigration or morally 
opposed to awarding public services to noncitizens, it is clear that any expenditure would 
be too much. On the other hand, proponents of immigrant rights advocate compassion for 
these politically disenfranchised, medically vulnerable persons living amongst us.8
 The stark disagreement about these individuals‘ moral status in society has 
resulted in their being almost entirely excluded from healthcare policy. Hospitals, 
therefore, are left with the problem of deciding whether or not to provide free 
(unreimbursed) or charitable (funded by private charitable contributions) care to these 
patients. This pressure can exacerbate inequities and therefore be unjust if not designed 
with a reasonable set of principles and processes in mind. Therefore, hospitals face what I 
believe is a moral duty to create a reasonably fair process for allocating the limited funds 
it has to help those without access to funds or insurance, and to maximize the ability of a 
community to care for those in its midst. 
 The problem resonates deeply with medical profession’s moral duty to care for 
those in need, whatever their race, country of origin, ability to pay, or legal status. It is a 
duty shared by many members of society: “so show your love for the alien, for you were 
aliens in the land of Egypt.”9 But hospitals, healthcare systems, and society at large can 
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not provide all services for everyone in need without encountering financing ruin. How 
exactly to allocate these resources invokes the notion of justice as fairness.10
  But how should a society adjudicate this dilemma? Should we decide based on 
their employment history, their duration of stay in the hospital’s jurisdiction, their 
potential to contribute, or how many children they have? How do we define who belongs 
to a community or a public which which shares some mutual responsibility for its 
members’ wellbeing? The problem hinges on the insufficiencies of American health 
policy’s ability to grapple with some realities in the world at large, even if they make for 
unpopular politics, but this national and international problem has strong consequences 
on a local level. Hospitals are increasingly being forced to make these microallocation 
decisions in real time, without the luxury of waiting expectantly for a political solution to 
the deeply divisive issues of immigration and healthcare financing. 
2. CASE HISTORY
 Despite the global proportions of this problem, for me it will forever have the 
concrete form of a single Thursday morning at Yale-New Haven Hospital, when I was a 
student member of a child psychiatry consultation team working in pediatric oncology. 
When I walked out of the elevator onto the familiar seventh floor that morning, I knew 
something interesting was brewing. Before my attending and I could put down our coats, 
we were approached by two senior members of the unit’s staff.  They were clearly 
distressed. “Have you heard,” they asked,” about A.?”11  A., we were told, was 16 years 
old, and suffering from cancer.  She was also described to us as an “illegal immigrant” 
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who might not receive treatment. The family might need our psychosocial services, we 
were told, because they were “under unbelievable stress.” Her story unfolded piecemeal.
 A. first presented to the emergency room of a regional hospital which is affiliated 
with Yale. There she appeared lethargic, and she exhibited abnormalities in her cranial 
nerve exam indicating a pathological process affecting her brain. Doctors learned that she 
had been diagnosed with a “blood cancer” and had begun treatment at home in 
Guatemala, but had stopped after two courses of chemotherapy because, according to her 
parents, they could not afford to pay for treatment. They traveled to the United States on 
what they described as a “work visa” which they had applied for and received some years 
earlier. In Connecticut, A. spent one night at her maternal aunt’s home and was 
subsequently taken to the emergency department of the Yale-affiliated hospital the next 
day.
 In the E.R., doctors noted her concerning mental status and learned about her 
oncological history. They ordered a computerized tomography scan of her head as well as 
as basic laboratory tests. These tests revealed blood counts consistent with a 
hematological malignancy, and the scan indicated that it had probably invaded her central 
nervous system. She was transferred to Yale-New Haven Hospital, where she underwent 
more specific testing including flow cytometry to establish a specific diagnosis so that 
she could begin treatment on a protocol. In the mean time, she received stabilizing 
treatment including steroids and a dose of chemotherapy, delivered intrathecally, aimed to 
prevent further neurological deterioration. The intracranial lesions were documented on 
an MRI of her brain. She was admitted to the pediatric oncology service and diagnosed 
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with Burkitt’s lymphoma—a tumor which is one of the fastest to grow and, potentially, 
fastest to shrink. Her disease was assessed to be Stage IV because it involved her central 
nervous system, and although this stage of disease is associated with a significantly lower 
survival rate, her chance of survival was estimated as “at least 50%.”12 
 At some point after her admission, her hospital course began to veer off of what 
would be expected for any 16-year-old being treated for a malignancy. Between her 
admission and when she finally began protocol-driven treatment, she and her family 
spent a few terrifying days waiting while the “hospital” decided whether this patient 
would get the expensive treatment that could potentially save her life.13 In the mean time, 
she also underwent surgical placement of a chemotherapy port, despite disagreements 
between hospital administrators and her physicians about whether to do this before her 
long-term plans were in place. 
 It was in this state of waiting that we found A., lying in bed, appearing deeply  
asleep, with her mother and father at her side. As a group, we filed into the small room 
where all the lights were off, and one by one introduced ourselves to A.’s mother and 
father, using a mix of English and Spanish. They were huddled in the corner of the room 
on the sofa, fit as close as possible to one another and to their daughter, looking sad and 
frightened. We all stood and spoke in soft tones, reflecting their mood. A few new details 
were acquired: A. seemed to be doing worse every day; the family was sleeping at the 
hospital but had family in a nearby town; A.’s health had been fine until about four 
months before, when she was seen for a recurrent sinus infection which turned out to be 
this cancer; they had possessed their visa for “years” but traveled to the U.S. only days 
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before; and the visa was sponsored by a relative in Arizona. Most of all, they had no 
money but were willing to do anything and sign anything that might assure their child of 
being treated. Outside the room, staff members were furious and exasperated, but also 
spoke softly, as if discussing a secret. They must have felt powerless to help this young 
person who was supposed to be under their direct care whilst a fast-growing tumor spread 
in her body and in her head.14 A care coordinator informed us that she was not eligible for 
any public insurance because of her immigration status, and that she was unable to send a 
referral to a research site such as the National Institutes of Health or St. Jude’s Hospital 
because she had already begun chemotherapy at home, and was therefore an unacceptable 
research subject. Besides, she was neurologically deteriorating and needed treatment 
immediately.
 One team member reported that A.’s aunt, a former hospital nurse, had been 
present during the week and that she was interested in doing anything that help her niece, 
including having an ethics consultation. (It is unclear whether she proposed this or 
whether she agreed to it when it was mentioned by a physician, nurse, or another person.) 
I found her phone number in the chart and called her directly. She told me that she was 
upset because she thought her cousin should be treated. She confirmed the visa story and 
said they were living with her mother, and that their only other American relative is the 
uncle in Arizona who had sponsored the visa. She was interested in meeting with the 
ethics committee but said that she would be working long shifts for the next three days.
 Our next call was to the chair of the pediatric ethics committee. He had already 
heard some details of the case, but was unaware of the entire story. He was on the floor 
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within a short time, and we all met with the family to gather more history. During this 
encounter, I remember being distracted by how still the patient looked. She was not 
moving in her sleep, not even blinking. I looked hard to see the covers rise and fall with 
her breath. An email went out to members of the ethics committee, and a meeting of a 
consultation team was scheduled for that evening, with a full committee meeting for the 
following day. At the same time, senior hospital leaders met with the girl’s oncologist to 
discuss the case. I asked whether I could attempt to secure legal representation for the 
patient through the university law school’s immigration clinic, but was told to wait.15
 Later in the evening, the ethics team delivered its recommendation to the hospital 
administrators, which included a) instituting treatment on this patient without further 
delay, and 2) devising a clear mechanism to guide these decisions in the future. (Cases 
involving undocumented and uninsured persons were not uncommon to the committee; a 
few years before, the adult ethics committee had considered writing a policy for cases 
like this, which was drafted as an “Policy for Extraordinary Treatment,” but it had not 
been developed nor approved.)
 A. began receiving chemotherapy early the next day. The final word was said to 
come from the hospital’s top physician, after receiving input from the committee. 
Nevertheless, the ethics committee met in a full session that day to discuss the situation. I 
joined as a member of the clinical team, which also included oncologists and department 
administrators, as well as members of social work, child life, and child psychiatry. Three 
of us were also on the ethics committee, balancing dual roles (but officially in the 
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capacity of clinical team members). The patient and family was not present, by 
committee choice. 
 The clinical history was presented by the patient’s oncologist. At a certain point in 
his story, it seemed that he didn’t know what to say. I wanted to treat her, he implied, but 
I didn’t have the power to do so. A senior physician reacted strongly to this sentiment, and 
directed his anger at the lone administrator in the room, a former nurse who spends long 
days (so I know from two separate experiences on the unit) securing benefits and tricky 
placements for patients who might otherwise fall through the cracks. She, too, had her 
hands tied by a senior administrator who was not present at the meeting. The case also 
provoked a lengthy discussion on the adult ethics committee’s email list, which spilled 
into an entire session of that group devoted to the subject. 
3. THE POWER OF LANGUAGE AND FRAME
 The problem of whether and how to treat noncitizens who require expensive care 
is a direct result of connections and boundaries in the real world: the busy routes of 
migration, travel, and trade which characterize the world today, and the legal boundaries 
which define a nation and its citizenry. But just as these real boundaries define the root of 
the problem, much of how the dilemma is understood and acted upon depends on the 
language and frame used in the story itself. In other words, the way this problem is 
conceived—as a problem of law, economics, or ethics—depends largely on the words 
chosen in the narrative itself.16
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 The first conversation in which this patient was described to me was exemplified 
this point. “A teenage girl was just admitted. She came from Guatemala, and was 
‘probably illegal.’” Immediately, her marked vulnerability and, at the same time, her 
otherness were battling for moral status in the very same utterance. Her identity was split 
incommensurably between these two roles: a deserving cancer patient, and a freeloading 
medical traveler. 
 A recent front-page New York Times article, “Illegal Immigrant’s Transplant, 
Cheaper Over Life, Isn’t Covered,” performs the same narrative split:
Without treatment to replace his failing kidneys, doctors knew, the man in 
Bellevue hospital would die. He was a waiter in his early 30s, a husband and 
father of two, so well liked at the Manhattan restaurant where he had worked for a 
decade that everyone from the customers to the dishwasher was donating money 
to help his family.
He was also an illegal immigrant.17
This fragment of the story begins with a clear appeal to the patient’s vulnerability: 
without the transplant he would die. This sentiment deepens as the man’s social ties are 
described, and we are led, by the end of the lead paragraph, to feel how he became so 
beloved while working his laborious job that people who should be mere strangers to him 
were eager to help him and his family.
 Narrative analysis of the news reports of the case of Jesica Santillian, the 17-year-
old Mexican immigrant who received two heart and lung transplants at Duke in February 
2003, thereby causing a public controversy about citizenship, charity, and the goals of 
medicine. The news depicted Jessica in similar polarities: either as “America’s angel” or 
a “thieving devil.”18 Something befell the waiter from the Times story and to A. as well. 
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Commentators on this phenomenon have called our attitude towards these individuals one 
of ambivalence and irresolvable conflict between “sympathy and exclusion,”19 or 
“compassion and repression.”20 The ends of the spectrum are well thought out, but the 
middle—where one might find a hard, pragmatic, imperfect, but potentially reasonable 
solution satisfying a variety of parties—remains elusive to characterize. 
 These stories also struggle between multiple seemingly incommensurate frames 
of reference. Does the dilemma result from federal policy, from our economic 
sensibilities, or from our sense of moral responsibility? As physicians or citizens? During 
the adult ethics committee’s discussion of A.’s case, the frame was one of economic loss 
and personal irresponsibility. The story of another recent patient was told by a hospital 
administrator on whose desk these difficult dilemmas often land:
 We had one woman from Mexico who was here in the hospital for a year getting 
 dialysis. No outpatient facility would accept her because she was an illegal 
 immigrant and had no insurance and no money. So she lived on a hospital floor 
 for a year, and we spent more than a million dollars on her. We asked whether she 
 had relatives or anyone who would help pay or take responsibility for her, but she 
 said no. We came up with plans to send her home to Mexico, but she said she 
 wanted to stay, and we couldn’t do anything about it. Finally, we convinced her 
 to go, on condition that we would pay for her to be transported and reintegrated 
 into the community at home in Mexico, where her dialysis would be covered by 
 the country’s national health insurance. When she got to the airport, there were a 
 dozen family members and others cheerfully waiting for her.21
But the denial of treatment is not always in society’s best financial interests. The Times 
story highlights this problem of political norms creating an economic inefficiency:
So when his younger brother volunteered to donate a kidney to restore him to 
normal life, they encountered a health care paradox: the government would pay 
for a lifetime of dialysis, costing $75,000 a year, but not for the $100,000 
transplant that would make it [dialysis] unnecessary.22
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This extra cost was a direct result of the norm that noncitizens are ineligibile for 
transplantation reimbursement. Programs can elec to transplant noncitizens, though at the 
risk of financial loss and potentially of audit by the transplantation center licensing 
body.23
 In the article, the focus shifted from the man’s plight to the cost of keeping him 
alive; the debate assumes a familiar tone of decrying waste. Inefficiency is not an 
injustice, per se, but it does exacerbate injustices by making resources even more scarce, 
which is disproportionately burdensome on the poor.24 The story also highlights an 
injustice in the organ allocation system, which tends to disfavor making immigrants 
recipients while accepting them disproportionately as donors.
 The financial frame of reference is omnipresent in our healthcare discourse on 
policy, in patient care, and even in bioethics. It is easy to interpret a noncitizen’s plight as 
a mere financial liability in a healthcare system where cost savings has become a core 
value of reform. For example, the chief executive of an Alabama hospital described his 
optimism surrounding the passing of his state’s strict 2010 immigration law:
 I certainly think [a decrease in healthcare costs as a result of the healthcare law] 
 has the opportunity to occur across the state [because] the majority of illegal 
 immigrants have no health insurance. [...] 
 
 Bad debt and charitable care are one of the biggest challenges both locally and 
 across the nation given the economic climate. There is certainly the possibility for 
 both of those to decline given this new law.25
What is most remarkable about this statement is how it relates utilization of charity care 
to mere financial loss, without much regard for the social value of this care. No spending, 
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however small, will be considered valuable, reasonable, or even tolerable when seen 
through a narrow lens where charity is synonymous with waste.
 By contrast, the story can be told in words amounting to a humane appeal to 
professional responsibility. During the ethics committee’s meeting, after this patient had 
already been approved for chemotherapy, a pediatrician and committee member posed the 
following question: is there any patient in the world who is more vulnerable to us than a 
minor, experiencing mental status changes undermining her agency and ability to speak 
for herself, lacking any ability to speak English, who has no money nor access to 
reimbursement through public or private insurance, and who is suffering an extremely 
quickly-progressing, expensive-to-treat, and yet highly curable disease? Hearing this 
formulation from my colleague threw the problem of an illegal immigrant wanting 
treatment into another frame altogether: the problem of a person, and a child at that, who 
needs care we are technically able to provide. Simply reframing this issue as one of moral 
responsibility and not economics or politics opened a new kind of conversation, and with 
it a new feeling about the case and the persons involved. 
 Unfortunately, this shift split the problem in a new way, which was equally 
oversimplified. It unfairly characterized physicians as advocates and administrators as 
impediments to this advocacy. In truth, there were no immoral actors in this play; just a 
lot of people—a whole institution, even—who were unprepared to make a quick, difficult 
decision based on, and simultaneously challenging our idealizations of, the principle of 
justice. 
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4. CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND METHODS
 Reflecting on A.’s case, a number of questions jump out with a kind of social and 
moral electricity. What exactly makes a person illegal, and—more to the point in the case
—were we absolutely sure this patient’s residency was illegal? What evidence did we 
have? It is not too easy for the term to catch onto a person, like a virus, whether or not 
their immigration status agrees?26 If they are truly “illegal” in the way our nation’s laws 
define it, what responsibilities should a physician, another clinician, a hospital 
administrator, a hospital have to reinforce these laws, at the expense of treating the ill? 
Should noncitizens without access to money or insurance be considered distinct from 
citizens who do not have such resources, for the purposes of allocating healthcare 
resources? What larger responsibilities to a public, whose goals include taking care of its 
own, are relevant when an “outsider” breaks its ranks? 
 I intend to address many of these concerns by way of analyzing the central 
question in A.‘s case: what is our obligation to patients who travel to this country 
explicitly for the purpose of receiving expensive, life-preserving treatment such as cancer 
care, organ transplantation, or dialysis? By looking at this less proximate (compared 
with citizens or longtime residents) moral claim on a community’s resources I hope to 
illuminate various norms and dynamics comprising this debate, while providing specific 
guidance to institutions facing a range of similar dilemmas, and suggestions of how to 
fairly and reasonably operationalize and govern these cases.
 In order to do so, I will begin in Chapter II by documenting the ambivalent ethos 
of charity present in the American medical profession’s professional ethics and in 
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changes in the form of healthcare delivery throughout the past century. Then, I will turn 
to Yale’s own history to articulate the competing interpretations of what a hospital is—
moral community, fiscal one, community organization, private business, and so on. 
Finally, I will review recent American healthcare policy affecting reimbursement for 
hospital care of noncitizens, as well as the status of these individuals in recent health 
reform, and the status of health in recent state-level immigration reform.
 In chapter III, I will focus on the ethics of the clinical problem of allocating 
presumably scarce resources to noncitizen patients requiring expensive hospital care. By 
deconstructing a set of common positions, I aim to show how complex the notion of 
belonging to a community is, and offer my take on which principles should be followed 
in performing these microallocation decisions. I will subsequently present a draft policy 
aimed to guide governance of this issue from within the hospital, including a statement of 
need, a set of essential principles (meant to be a practical distillation of chapter III), and a 
proposed process for making these difficult, imperfect microallocation decisions in real 
time. This process will incorporate substantial scrutiny of how these principles are 
operationalized and governed within the complicated moral community of the hospital, 
where power can so easily alter one’s experience of life and death. 
 I will conclude with a discussion of some inherent flaws in this pragmatic 
approach, and a recommendation for how this case my be more justly framed and 
governed in public policy. 
 In order to address these complex issues, I will employ evidence from history, 
politics, law, and public health in order to objectively explore this issue from all sides. In 
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my ethical analysis, I will contend with a variety of positions which lead me to the 
original hospital policy found in Chapter IV. My research has spring from a previous 
draft of a possible policy for “extraordinary treatment,” as well as extensive debate on 
this topic conducted by members of the adult and pediatric ethics committees at Yale, but 
this hospital policy has not been seen, discussed, approved, or used by Yale in any 
respects. It is my own original work, intended as a work of scholarship and as one 
suggestion for how a place like Yale-New Haven Hospital may strategize its use of 
charity funds in these increasingly common cases. Since the charity funds possessed by 
Yale have diminished in recent years (see Table I) while the population of uninsured 
persons and noncitizens living here grows, I believe the hospital has a duty to judiciously 
plan out its approach to the problem of noncitizens—both newly-arrived and well-
established ones—who need expensive, often life-preserving, care, in order to minimize 
confusion and injustice.
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I I .  CH A R I T Y CA R E  A N D  T H E  NO N C I T I Z E N: 
HI STORI CAL AND PO L I T I C A L RO O T S  I N  AM E R I C A N  MEDICINE
1. CHARITY AND NONCITIZENSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
American Medicine’s Founding Ethos
 The 1847 document “Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association,” 
published in the year of the guild’s formation, has been used by commentators as 
evidence of how the notions of charity, beneficence, and equity are present at the roots of 
American medicine. Hoffman (2006) cites references to “eleemosynary [charitable] 
services”; to the idea of caring for “indigent” patients; and to providing services with 
“gratitude, thusly accorded.”27 In her essay, as in the public imagination, the American 
medical profession has at its origin a strong ethos of service, an ethos which has been 
gradually corrupted by exclusionary federal policy, by the rise of biomedical technology 
with its focus on research and progress, and by managed care with its emphasis on 
economic efficiency—each at the cost of human values within the profession.28  
 However, a close reading of the 1847 Code of Ethics shows that the obligation to 
care for the underserved is articulated in strong tension with various other factors, such as 
the “dignity of the profession” and the notion of justice. All in all, the duty to care for 
those in need is articulated as a limited one wherever it occurs in the text. For example, 
the 1847 Code says:
 There is no profession, by the members of which, eleemosynary [charitable] 
 services are more liberally dispensed, than the medical, but justice requires that 
 some limits should be placed to the performance of such good offices.29
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Charity is not presented as a moral duty, but simply a fact of the profession, not worth 
pushing as a guideline.30  Furthermore, the passage continues by acknowledging—in the 
very same sentence, without a full stop to separate these ideas of obligation and 
boundaries—that limits should be recognized as inherent to the idea of charity. 
 This statement may contain a variety of moral suggestions, among these that 
fairness to the profession means fair renumeration. This stance would help the AMA 
secure the economic and social status of the profession for many decades to come.31 
Furthermore, by acknowledging that “some limits must be placed,” even members of a 
profession which is known above all others for its commitment to helping those in need, 
are not positioned to alleviate all the suffering around them, nor can the profession be 
expected to solve all the injustices in the world. A provider should not be expected to 
dedicate his whole practice to volunteerism, lest it be utterly unsustainable, forcing him 
to abandon those to whom he dedicated himself in the beginning. In other words, charity 
should not overwhelm the profession’s viability. 
 And nor should it tarnish its character. In “Duties for the Support of Professional 
Character,” the 1847 code states: “It is derogatory to the dignity of the profession [for a 
physician to be seen] publicly offering advice and medicine to the poor gratis.”32 This 
prohibition suggests a way of doing charity care that occurs under the table: 
 Neither institutions endowed by the public or by rich individuals, societies for 
 mutual benefit, for the insurance of lives or for analogous purposes, nor any 
 profession or occupation, can be admitted to possess [...] valid claims for 
 gratuitous services.”33
One possible interpretation is that the practice of providing free care to those in need was 
so common in mid-19th century medicine that the code needn’t make a point of 
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physicians’ responsibility to provide this service. But charity is also presented as a threat 
to medicine’s status and security, something worth hiding and downgrading, an 
inconvenience in the rise of political, scientific, and moral status of the profession. There 
is a fear, moreover, that “rich individuals” and the companies offering “insurance of lives 
or for analogous purposes” will by default avoid sharing the responsibility to care for the 
underserved of the day.34 There is even a danger that the virtue of beneficence will be 
capitalized upon by the wealthy: the AMA advises that physicians who should “should 
not give advice gratis to the affluent; because his doing so is an injury to his professional 
brethren.”35 
 All in all, the code articulates a physician’s duty as limited with respect to his 
deserving patients, and to the society at large wherein he operates:
 The office of a physician can never be supported as an exclusively beneficent one; 
 and it is defrauding, in some degree, the common funds for its support, when fees 
 are dispensed with, which might justly be claimed.36
Of note, a physician’s duty to the “welfare” and “benefit of the community” is frequently 
mentioned,37 but nowhere is there any discussion of who exactly qualifies for this right. 
Nor to the status of immigrants, refugees, noncitizens, or other persons of need whose 
social class would disqualify them from the social programs of the time.
 The 1847 statement articulates a clear ambivalence about charity: it is one of 
medicine’s core values, but it is potentially an economic and political hazard and a 
temptation to veer from realistic practice, which in 1847, as today, involved economic 
sustainability.
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Professional Codes Today
 Current professional codes articulate the same kind of ambivalence expressed in 
the 1847 document. The AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics, first adopted in 1957, does 
declare that “a physician shall support access to medical care for all people.”38 However, 
this notion was prioritized at the very bottom of the document as the ninth principle of 
nine. Similarly, the more extensive “Code of Medical Ethics” of the AMA states that “all 
physicians should work to ensure that the needs of the poor in their communities are met. 
Caring for the poor should be a regular part of the physician’s practice schedule.”39 But 
this incitement is filed deep within the code in Opinion 9.065, below entire sections on 
“Fees and Charges,” “Continuing Medical Education,” and “Free Choice,” which states 
that “free choice of physicians is the right of every individual.”40 Nevertheless, 
physicians should accept “a part of the responsibility for the medical care of those who 
cannot afford essential health care."41 Similarly, The American College of Physicians 
(ACP) Ethics Manual (2012) states, in its section on “Financial Arrangements,” that 
“Each individual physician is obliged to do his or her fair share [...] to provide services 
for uninsured and underinsured persons” based on “their professional obligation to care 
for the poor.”42
 Other professional statements do go somewhat further than the AMA’s does in 
recognizing the duty to perform charitable practice. American Association of Family 
Physicians engages directly with the political realm, specifically opposing laws requiring 
physicians to report unauthorized immigrants or criminalizing the care of these persons.43
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2. HOSPITAL CHARITY IN AMERICAN MEDICAL HISTORY
Early Hospital Charity
 From its roots in the hospitals and medical schools founded more than a century 
ago, American medicine has been organized around the notion of charity, meaning 
providing care to those who can not afford it. Yet the very same institutions displayed 
sharp boundaries around who deserved such care, what it would entail, and where and 
when it would be provided. By examining the recent development of healthcare policy 
affecting both authorized and unauthorized noncitizens living in the United States, I aim 
to illustrate how this ambivalence about the virtue of beneficence has carried through in 
the modern healthcare system, thereby framing the social dynamics and financial 
pressures shaping medical practice today. 
 Around the time of the 1910 Flexner Report, American academic hospitals usually 
incorporated charity into their educational offering and clinical services.44 The impulse 
may not have been entirely altruistic. In his history of the American medical profession, 
Starr (1982) writes that the notion of charity was wrapped tightly in social status, as well 
as in a moral agenda. He describes how the “wealthy transformed charity dollars into 
social status; by participating in the social good, they could also push a social agenda.”45 
At the same time, these charity institutions began to transform in their essential quality. 
What was really happening to the hospital at the turn of the 20th century, Starr argues, 
was its “reorganization [...] along the lines of a business rather than a charity.”46 
 Does a for-profit hospital, ostensibly focused more on business than charity, have 
different measurable behaviors as a result of its primary mission? One study of 17 private 
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non-profit hospitals bought and converted to for-profit entities between 1980 and 1992 
showed that three years after the change to private status, a hospital’s ratio of 
unreimbursed care to total expenditures did not change significantly. Most remarkably, 
though, was that unreimbursed care was less than 3% for each type.47 This poverty of 
services was also found in a study of Californian not-for-profit hospitals, where in 20% 
failed to provide “community dividends” in accord with of the tax subsidies they 
receive.48 Another study factored in a wide range of expenditures and losses consistent 
with the notion of “community benefit,” and found that 43% of these expenditures were 
on discounts for private insurers. “This raises the question of why nonprofit hospitals use 
the community’s funds for activities that transfer money within the community rather 
than on activities that make the community as a whole better off,” the authors 
concluded.49
A Local History at Yale
 Burrow (2002) reports that Yale’s medical school and hospitals continually 
“struggled” with their relationship to the community, and in general with the notion of 
what he calls “social responsibility.”50 It was true that "local influences played an 
important role in shaping the medical school," but these relationships were complex from 
their very origin. 
 In 1810, the Connecticut Medical Society and Yale College collaborated to start 
the Medical Institute of Yale College, which later became Yale School of Medicine. 
Subsequently, a local state hospital was founded by local physicians and Yale faculty, but 
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only one of its ten founding corporators, William Leffingwell, was a layperson who 
represented the community more than the profession.51 Because of doubts they 
maintained about the proposed hospital’s commitment to New Haven and Connecticut at 
large, the state legislature resisted funding this hospital as legislatures had done in 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York. In response, the New Haven Medical 
Association formed a committee which declared that “the hospital shall be a charitable 
institution and no physician or surgeon shall receive any compensation for his services." 
This encouraged the legislature to supply $5,000 to the fund in 1826, thereby making 
New Haven Hospital the nation’s fourth voluntary hospital, along with the Pennsylvania, 
New York Hospital, and Massachusetts General Hospitals, each of which had similar 
origins.52
 The intention was to create a charitable institution, and the social norms 
underlying selection of worthy recipients of charity were largely determined by those 
contributing the funds. For example, during New Haven’s 1833 cholera epidemic, “the 
Board of Health wanted the new hospital to treat cholera patients. But the hospital 
directors claimed that [the patients’] character forbade admissions of patient with 
communicable diseases.”53 This was common practice at the time:
 Persons who were contagious, vagrant, or morally suspect were not welcome in 
 most voluntary [what has become non-profit or charity] hospitals. The mentally ill 
 and chronically ill were also not admitted. Rather, most voluntary hospitals were 
 for the "deserving poor," the citizens who could not recover in their usual 
 residencies (servants in fashionable homes, for example).54
 The early charter at New Haven Hospital was no different.55 According to Burrow’s 
history, the community reacted strongly to their own being turned away during the 
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cholera epidemic, which "slowed popular acceptance of the hospital.”56 Physician groups, 
for a variety of reasons, became estranged from the medical school and from New Haven 
Hospital, leading to the founding of two more institutions—St. Raphael’s and Grace 
Hospital.57  
 Early on, Yale College was the intellectual and financial center of the University, 
while the medical school suffered from "chronic underfunding" and “the recurrent threat 
of medical-school extinction.”58 This trend persisted until the technological 
transformation which led to medicine’s ascendance in society occurred. In the 1960's the 
medical school began to produce its own revenue, largely corresponding to the emphasis 
on research, not clinical care.59 At the same time, after World War II, the hospital declared 
itself not responsible for community members who were unable to pay. According to 
Burrow, Yale’s Director of Medical Affairs at the time "concluded that in reality the 
patients—and appropriate third parties—were actually responsible for the cost of their 
illness."60 
 Now, Yale-New Haven is the largest distributor of charity care in the state of 
Connecticut (see Table I). These charity dollars are largely spent as unreimbursed 
expenditures from its Free Care fund, which is available to anyone, including 
undocumented immigrants, who have been denied public benefits. The hospital has also 
gone outside of its own walls to purchase equipment and services on a noncitizen 
patient’s behalf, such as funding outpatient palliative care services for a pediatric 
oncology patient and undocumented immigrant whose family preferred her to die at 
home.61 The hospital could have chosen to keep her in house to merely lose the operating 
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costs rather than paying or these services from another vendor, but they saw the immense 
social value in granting this family their wishes during the final weeks of life for their 
child.
 These acts of charity have not come without considerable strife. The Free Care 
program was created out of a scandal involving not an undocumented person but a 
longtime New Haven resident. In 2003, a story ran on the front page of the Wall Street 
Journal describing how a man named Quinton White, a 77-year-old former dry cleaner 
from New Haven with kidney failure and heart disease, was being pursued by debt 
collectors who were contracted by Yale-New Haven Hospital.62 He had owed $18,740 
after his wife, who was diseased at the time of the collection efforts, had been treated 
there in 1982. Subsequently, the hospital’s debt collectors engaged in a decades-long 
pursuit of Mr. White employing what the article calls “relentless collection techniques.” 
Mr. White’s home was subject of a lein despite his paying off $16,000 of the debt, which 
by that time had grown to in excess of $50,000.63 At the same time, a series of class-
action lawsuits involving individuals who were treated unfairly because they had no 
access to the lower fee structure used by public and private insurers.64 
3. AMERICAN HEALTHCARE POLICY ON CHARITY AND NONCITIZEN HEALTHCARE
Obligations to Benefit the Community
 In 2008, Senator Charles Grassley began an investigation into the perceived 
“evolution” of non-profit hospitals into businesslike entities in order to “hold nonprofit 
hospitals more accountable for the billions of dollars in annual tax exemptions they 
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enjoy.”65 Grassley’s investigation into the tax-exempt status of non-profit hospitals comes 
long after a set of changes in the nature of how law defines a hospital’s duty to its 
community, beginning with with  “charitable care standard” which was written into the 
tax code in 1956. This standard explicitly mandated that “the hospital must be operated 
so that services are provided, to the extent of its financial ability, to those who are not 
able to pay and not exclusively to those who are able and expected to pay.” In 1969, this 
was replaced by current “community benefit standard.” It requires only that a non-profit 
hospital must house an emergency room, unless one is already present in the 
community.66
 Grassley’s efforts, like the lawsuit filed in 2003 against Yale by the State of 
Connecticut, rest on legislation which has come to be known as The Hill-Burton Act of 
1946, which authorized funds for hospital construction to as much as half of the nation’s 
hospitals between the law’s inception in and the last year of funding, 1996.67 Each 
hospital that received funds was obligated in turn to provide what was initially described 
as a “reasonable” amount of charity to those without access to services, and to those 
living in the community where the hospital makes its home.68 These obligations are 
known, respectively, as the “uncompensated care obligation” and the “community 
obligation.”
EMTALA
 The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA) 
protects a rudimentary set of hospital services for any person who needs them, regardless 
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of citizenship status or ability to pay. This legislation was written to prevent cases such as 
the one which resulted in Guerrero v. Copper Queen (1975). In that case, the Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a parent of two young children who had been forced to 
drive 18 miles to a county hospital from the private Copper Queen Hospital in the border 
city of Bisbee, Arizona to received care for severe burns they had endured in a kitchen 
explosion at their home in Sonora, Mexico.69 The court found that the lack of citizenship 
was not enough to deny these individuals emergency care, based explicitly on the fact 
that the legislature had not defined whether legal citizenship or residency should be a 
factor into the decision. The legislature and the courts both failed to articulate any moral 
norm, and they ignored whether the patient’s legal status as minors should factor into the 
decision, or into any just policy.
 In order to protect patients from what had happened to the Guerreros,  EMTALA 
was passed by the U.S. Congress as part of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1986.70 It established a limited right to treatment for any person requiring emergency care 
or labor and delivery services, regardless of citizenship status, insurance status, and 
ability to pay. As one co-sponsor of the bill said, "the practice of rejecting indigent 
patients in life threatening situations for economic reasons alone is unconscionable.”71 
EMTALA was a marked shift from most states’ legal precedents which held that hospitals 
had no duty to care for such patients.72
 Under EMTALA, any hospital taking medicare funding—nearly all of American 
facilities—must fulfill two obligations for all patients with “emergency medical 
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conditions” and women in active labor: provide appropriate medical screening 
examination73 and stabilize a patient enough to enable transfer or discharge.74 
 Diekema (1995) commends EMTALA’s specific objective (“to establish in law a 
right to emergency care") as well as its underlying norm (promoting the “equal treatment 
of all individuals requiring care”).75 However, for him the law contains two major 
problems which merit review because these insufficiencies illustrate the significant social 
pressures facing hospitals and noncitizen patients today.
 Firstly, the law’s vagueness may subvert its intent to provide a common level of 
care to all patients, regardless of social status. Because of “widespread confusion” about 
actions specified by the law—what constitutes presence inside a healthcare facility, 
exactly who performs the screening examination, and what is meant by an “emergency 
medical condition”—there remains significant potential for separate, unequal, but legally 
sufficient processes of screening, stabilization, treatment, and transfer for different 
patients. For example, case law has found that being hooked up to telemetry devices 
monitored by hospital personnel has been found insufficient to constitute “presence” by 
courts, but driving onto a hospital parking area in a private ambulance does.76 This 
vagueness speaks to the difficulty of determining exactly when a patient enters into a 
hospital which may need to assume responsibility for their care.
 Secondly, EMTALA did not support the norm it establishes with any financial 
strength, and subsequent sources of funding have been insufficient, time-limited, and 
subject to inclusion criteria that exclude a considerable segment of the population of 
noncitizens.77 For example, one key reimbursement mechanism, known as “Emergency 
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Medicaid,” was authorized as part of the Immigrant Responsibility and Control Act of 
1986.78 The program authorized temporary extension of benefits to individuals requiring 
emergency care who meet individual states’ Medicaid criteria, which today largely 
exclude all undocumented immigrant adults as well as legal noncitizens who have yet to 
reside (and in some cases, to be legally employed) in the sponsoring state for a period of 
five years.79 These barriers were strengthened by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996, also known as the “Welfare Reform Act,” which cut the funding 
for health services benefitting noncitizens The bill “took away all federally funded 
preventative preventative health care for illegal immigrations, while providing access 
only for emergency services and treatment for communicable diseases.” 80
PPACA, Medicaid, and its Financing
 During public debate of the federal healthcare reform acts of the 111th 
congressional season which culminated in H.R. 3590, the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act” (PPACA), the White House was criticized for supporting 
immigrants’ rights to healthcare. Specifically, they were said to support unauthorized 
aliens’ participation in insurance exchanges, in the failed public option, and in the 
expanded public insurance programs—in all the features of reform aimed to increase 
access and decrease costs. The president himself carefully denounced claims that the 
white house was going to cover “illegals.”81 
 The resulting legislation provides for a marked expansion of public insurance as 
well as the creation of health insurance exchanges, but neither will benefit noncitizens. 
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Since the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986, Medicaid eligibility 
criteria has excluded all unauthorized immigrants; after the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, states were awarded the right 
to experiment with eligibility requirements, resulting in the additional exclusion of many 
legal residents who have not met durational requirements.82 Furthermore, by barring 
immigrants from participating in state health insurance exchanges, they limit these 
persons from a major solution to the dual problems of access to care and cost control. 
(PPACA also provides for the creation of a contested individual mandate for coverage 
which may apply to noncitizens.)
 In general, PPACA solidifies federal policies systematically excluding 
undocumented immigrants and many legal noncitizens from public insurance and 
insurance incentives. Furthermore, as the dominant legislation package addressing issues 
of access to care and financial concerns within the American healthcare system, PPACA 
has made other inclusive federal solutions all but political impossible. This includes the 
reauthorization of funds such as those contributed by the budget  authorizations made in 
1997 and 2003, intended to supplement Emergency Medicaid as a way for willing 
hospitals to cover the provision of extensive services to noncitizens.83
Recent State Policies
 In 1994, 59% of California voters elected to bar illegal immigrants from Medical 
and to institute a variety of measures discouraging these individuals from seeking 
healthcare and other social services, some of which recruited healthcare professionals to 
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aid in their enforcement.84 Despite passing by a comfortable margin, the law was blocked 
by the California Supreme Court, based on the fact that immigration is the administrative 
responsibility of the federal government. 
 However, immigration is often the financial responsibility of more local 
communities, including counties and states. In 1996, one political leader acknowledged 
the contradiction embodied by EMTALA, where federal mandates can come without 
attention to their funding. In this case, non-enforcement of immigration laws was 
interpreted to be a “mandate” to tolerate noncitizens in communities. “How can any 
Member walk on this floor, deny the citizens of California the right to implement 
proposition 187, without expecting California to come right back here and ask for $3 
billion from the Federal Government annually to pay California for the cost of a Federal 
failure?"85 His solution, like many critics of laws protecting illegal aliens’ rights to some 
kind of care, was to side with the voters of California, at the time mired in recession, to 
eliminate such legal rights for illegal people.
 Commenting on Proposition 187 in the New England Journal of Medicine, Ziv 
and Lo (1995) argued that the law endangers the public health, denies care to persons in 
need, and violates patient confidentiality in unprecedented ways.86 They also report how 
the deaths of two individuals which occurred in the period between when the law passed 
and when it was declared unconstitutional in California Supreme Court, appeared to be 
the result of unauthorized aliens delaying the act of seeking treatment because of fears of 
identification and deportation.87
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 Today, similarly strict state immigration policies have begun to be instituted in 
Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia where legislatures have made it a crime for nonresidents 
not to carry authorized papers.88 These laws were opposed by educators, doctors, and 
others on the grounds that they turned their professions into auxiliary support for the 
government’s efforts to control the migration of persons.
Conclusion 
 Healthcare policy has affected the coverage of noncitizen patients in a few key 
ways. Firstly, it has met increasing financial and social pressures with insufficient 
economic resources, shifting the financial responsibility onto hospitals and localities and 
thereby exacerbating bias against immigrants. Partially countering this strategy is the 
EMTALA legislation which guarantees what might be considered minimally humane 
treatment for these individuals, avoiding the moral catastrophes such as what happened to 
the Guerreros and to countless women who feared that seeking hospital services at the 
time of birth would put them at risk for identification and deportation. 
 Secondly, federal and state public insurance policies have articulated an 
insufficient set of norms defining what it means to be part of the American community. 
Legal residence remains the only factor represented in the law, despite the millions of 
immigrants who remain here undocumented, and who may contribute significantly to 
American communities through employment and in other capacities. 
 Finally, state policies such as the now-overturned Proposition 187 in California 
and the 2011 laws in Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama which require the policing of public 
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institutions have allowed the state’s interests in controlling the migration of persons to 
become a core public value, and one that is meant to be shared, despite considerable 
objection from physicians, teachers, and law enforcement, by the public servants and 
professionals working in these communities, and by courts reviewing early legal 
challenges to these legislations.
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I I I .  ETHICS  OF  HO S P I TA L CH A R I T Y CA R E  ALLOCATION
1. MEDICAL CARE IS NOT AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE
 The history of Burkitt’s lymphoma is a compelling example of modern medicine’s 
power to improve the lives of human beings. Between 1957—when Denis Burkitt 
originally described a series of 38 Ugandan patients suffering from what appeared to be a 
tumor of the jaw—and the present day, advances in chemotherapy and molecular 
oncology have produced at least a fourfold improvement in survival.89 New proposed 
treatments such as those using a monoclonal antibody—a potent symbol of recent 
medical progress—provide even more hope.90 At the same time, those living in resource-
poor countries suffer a greatly increased risk of developing the disease and of dying from 
it.91 These risks stem not only from viral and immunological factors (such as Epstein Barr 
Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) but from socioeconomic 
ones as well.92
 Pellegrino and Thomasma declare that “the existence of a genuine medical need 
constitutes a moral claim on those equipped to help.”93 Those equipped to help includes 
the medical professionals who possess the knowledge and skills to cure or palliate illness, 
and it includes members of the public at large, who must take some interest in one 
another’s well-being, and especially in the well-being of those least empowered to help 
themselves. In this sense, those equipped to help form a considerable number in the 
United States country alone, where only one ten-thousandth of the population—just 
14,000 families—acquire enough wealth every week to fund an entire course of 
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chemotherapy and hematopoietic stem cell transplant (an efficacious treatment for 
recurrent disease) for a child such as A.94 
 But Burkitt’s is only one type of disease, and a relatively uncommon one. It is 
reasonable to think that our wealth might be used to provide for basic comprehensive 
healthcare for all persons present in the United States—legal citizen or otherwise—but it 
would be impossible to cover the entire population of the Americas, much less the entire 
world’s population.95 Indeed, for however compelling each genuine medical need appears 
to physicians and others in the helping professions, there exists a point at which the 
ability to address these needs is circumscribed by resource limitations. At this point, the 
moral claims of individuals begin to conflict.96 Any community operating under the 
condition of limited resources makes decisions, intentionally or by default, about how its 
resources will be distributed.
Concerns About the Nature of Money
 Two criticisms of this formulation of financial scarcity are worth mentioning. 
First, one can question whether financial resources are truly limited in the way that 
organs or devices such as the mechanical ventilator or extracorporeal membrane oxygen 
machine. Is money a reliable enough foundation for life-or-death decisions? Can it be 
redistributed effectively? Unlike the physical substance of vital organs, which can be 
cooled, transported to another county or state, and then given whole hog to another 
person, money is symbolic and changeable, and potentially unreliable. Routine 
phlebotomy may cost someone paying with cash twice what it costs an third party who 
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has pre-negotiated their rates with a laboratory, though these procedures are identical in 
terms of time, equipment, and expertise required to perform the job.97 And that is not to 
mention the social and emotional issues which make money seem to be an unreliable 
substance on which to build a system striving to achieve moral clarity. 
 Secondly, distributive justice is most just when applied to large populations and a 
wide range of problems.98 Even if the allocation process is confined to the hospital level,  
it would be practically impossible to adjudicate every request for treatment which plays 
into the hospital’s unreimbursed expenditures. Confining the task to only the free bed 
fund dollars enforces clear boundaries of the system, and makes the task practical. But it 
also further separates the problem from its root—inequities in the system at large—and it 
involves a kind of selection bias for only the most expensive cases, which tend to involve 
the sickest individuals. These individuals might be penalized for the severity of their 
illness, when this can also be seen as a moral claim to be treated.99
 These two claims contribute to a practical problem: if a policy were to be devised 
for “expensive” charity care, what should be threshold which activates it? Is it reasonable 
to set a quantitative trigger for such a policy, knowing that healthcare prices will probably 
inflate, and a hospital’s ability to pay will also change over time? Is $50,000 of treatment 
worth the same to a 90-year-old as it is to a 5-year-old? Is contributing that for them 
worth the same to us, as a public?
 Furthermore, what about the costs of not treating a person with expensive curative 
treatment or surgery? It stands to reason that if a fair procedure were to be put in place, its 
very success may result in a tragic death, however justified the death may appear to, or 
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amy actually, be. To avoid making this situation truly inhumane, the hospital should 
provide palliative care for patients for whom there are no charity funds. But the costs of 
this care are significant: by one estimate, about $40,000 per patient with a terminal 
illness, averaged over a variety of end-of-life scenarios.100 A person could never be 
reasonably denied a $50,000 treatment with a reasonable chance of cure for a $40,000 
course of palliative care with zero chance of survival. But there is some difference in 
money which may reasonably justify this alternative.
 However appealing these arguments are, it is key to point out that money—and all 
its associated irrationalities and injustices—can not be simply set aside. A hospital must 
operate in the financial realm in order to justify its beneficent mission, despite the 
compelling myth of Asclepius, which illustrated how we hope for care and coin to be 
separate.101 Additionally, the comparison with organs is illuminating. For however 
concrete organs may seem compared with money, the supply of transplantable organs is 
still thoroughly dependent on social values and public policy.102
 Ultimately, neither concern addresses what should be done with an individual 
patient presenting to a hospital which possesses a limited quantity of charity funds. Does 
the symbolic nature of money obligate us to care for a patient like A.? Do the inequities 
in our society? These lines of thinking reflect important work yet to be done within the 
healthcare system, but they distract from the problem of what to do with A. given what 
inequalities and absurdities of pricing exist within the hospital and in society at large. 
These problems may indeed be at the root of her dilemma, but they can not be solved 
quickly enough to prevent the tumor from consuming her.103
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2. A POLICY IS NECESSARY TO MAKE ALLOCATION REASONABLY FAIR
 A key worry about allocation is that whoever writes the policy will be able to fix 
the odds in their favor, or set the social agenda underlying it. As discussed in Chapter II, 
physicians and hospital administrators have historically used the their power to control 
the allocation of resources, as well as the notion of charity itself, to push social agendas 
unrelated to the health of the population at large.104 
 To address this fear, it is crucial that a policy be grounded in the philosophical 
principle of justice. Specifically, it needs to promote equity (all persons having equal 
opportunity to obtain a minimum set of resources, no matter what their social standing) as 
well as efficiency (judicious use of resources in order to maximize their impact across the 
population, especially for those of least means). These principles are critical because 
health or healthcare is not just another good; health has special moral importance, such 
that inequities in income and other financial resources can lead directly to injustices.105 A 
process should be governed in a way that promotes transparency and consensus in order 
to maximize accountability within the process, and accord with the values various 
constituencies that comprise the public.106 It should also involve well thought out 
processes of self-regulation or external review, and public accessibility.107
3. CARE SHOULD NOT BE WITHHELD BASED SOLELY ON IMMIGRATION STATUS
 A situation of limited resources necessitates a fair allocation mechanism to ensure 
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that justice is maximized when balancing the individual rights of each member of a 
public. But how does one define a public? Do the rights of non-citizens always represent 
less of a moral claim than those of individuals who possess citizenship, either by birth or 
naturalization? What about legal immigrants or permanent residents, who are largely 
ineligible for public insurance despite being in bounds of the law?
 It is my contention that immigration status does not reflect the value of a person 
in a community, nor does it honor the dignity of the medical profession’s way of 
apprehending individual persons. The use of a legal and political norm to allocate 
healthcare resources constitutes a threat to professional dignity and a violation of 
professional ethics. Illegal immigrants should not be excluded from healthcare merely 
because they are “illegal,” because doing so would mistake the state’s interest in 
controlling the migration of persons with the profession’s aims to support the health of 
patients and public at large, truly denigrating the ethos of the profession and its ability to 
assess and to care for those in need.
Citizens’ obligations to the public
 A key counterargument to this position is based in the responsibility that members 
of a citizenship—including doctors and other professionals—have to that community’s 
integrity. Like doctors, citizens have obligations to the public, including to its laws. 
Proponents of society can say that the nation has a moral duty to keep its boundaries 
intact. If members of a public are suffering because of inequity, the moral claims brought 
by noncitizens may be seen as an honest threat to mutual care within the group.
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 This “nationalist” argument fails because medical professionals have special 
relationships with those for whom they care.108 Furthermore, it disguises how citizens 
and noncitizens both may be valuable residents of a place. As Dwyer (2004) points out, 
"the narrow framework of the debate pits poor citizens against illegal aliens in a battle for 
health care resources.”109 In some cases, treating some noncitizens may even produce 
benefits for public, including the prevention of advanced disease (with its associated 
costs) and control of infectious diseases.110 
 However, a patient such as A., however, suffering from a non-infectious disease 
which is already advanced, does not not fit this public health benefit scheme. Therefore, a 
justification for this treatment or withholding thereof must come from a source other than 
the utility to society of treating these persons, such as their vulnerability or their inherent 
value as human beings.
 Another counterargument involves the nature of the national public from which 
these patients are excluded. If individuals comprise the citizenry, and the government is 
simply the representation of these individuals, then what is the moral discrepancy 
between a medical profession and a government which administers to this public? Both, 
in theory, are working in the best interests of the public; why need physicians dedicate 
themselves against this nation’s immigration policy?
 I contend that the public (whose health is a concern primarily of doctors) and the 
state (whose integrity is a primary concern of immigration authorities and lawmakers) are 
similar but that their differences in ethos and duty are critical in the noncitizen dilemma. 
These differences are illustrated by the way that meaning is made in each domain. In law, 
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“undocumented immigrant” signifies illegitimate legal status as a resident, a simple 
breach of the law. However, in medicine, the identity of “undocumented immigrant” is a 
risk factor for structural violence and lack of access to care, and a proxy for poverty and 
all the health risks that condition brings. Furthermore, enforcing anti-immigrant norms 
might compromise a physician’s ability to protect patient privacy—a small breach of 
dignity—and it could potentially cause outcomes as disastrous as in capital punishment, 
regardless of whether the physician was actively or passively causing death. All of these 
problems accompany the mistake of confusing the state’s interest in controlling the 
migration of persons for any reasonable goals of the medical profession.
 Yet another argument for the nationalist position is that it is an arbitrary but 
convenient way to distinguish people when some distinction must be made.111 
Unfortunately, this does not acknowledge the profound vulnerability of these persons, nor 
does it attempt to minimize bias which endangers just allocation.
Screening Citizenship as a System of Distributive Justice
 Finally, some justify the use of characteristics such as legal citizenship status not 
as binary moral judgment but as a way to define the public—in short, as a theory of 
distributive justice. (The difference between these two may seem small, but it is the 
difference between a law and a philosophic norm.) In this sense, it is clear that the use of 
citizenship status fails as a matter of social science. By using citizenship to define what is 
meant by the idea of community membership, we flatten a complex and age-old social 
phenomenon of human migration into a simple binary class: are you or are you not one of 
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us? The reality is much more complex: noncitizens contribute to the tax base, they 
contribute to the workforce, and they endow a community with cultural goods. They may 
even use fewer resources of social welfare compared with equals from a citizenship class, 
and overall, citizens who are uninsured or underinsured present even greater financial 
burdens to American hospitals.112 It is clear that the nationalist position, as Dwyer writes,  
“focuses too narrowly on what we owe people based on legal rules and formal 
citizenship.”113
4. Alternatives to Citizenship: Contribution, Attachments, Age, and Vulnerability
 If citizenship status is too vague and politically-charged for use in healthcare 
allocation, what criteria would be fair enough to use? By way of finding a middle ground, 
some have proposed that noncitizens should be allocated healthcare benefits based on 
their contribution to society through work.114 This formulation is sociologically honest; it  
recognizes that immigration is an ancient human phenomenon and that its regulation is 
new and difficult to fully enforce. Furthermore, this formulation reflects how 
undocumented immigrants may contribute significantly to the public in a number of ways 
which deserve to be rewarded, including through taxes (especially local sales and use 
taxes) and also through work. Often this work is that which few citizens will perform, 
contributing labor on which entire industries may rest. 
 One striking example of the real contribution to the nation’s economy made by 
undocumented immigrant workers occurred subsequent to the passing of the strict state 
immigration laws in Alabama, Georgia, and Alabama during 2010. These strict policies 
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created a severe labor shortage which some have called a “man-made disaster.”115 For 
example, a North Carolina farmer who runs one state’s oldest and most successful 
vegetable growers is at risk of losing his business because the laborers he now has access 
to is limited to the more costly H-2A Temporary Agricultural Work Program program:
 What too many politicians and people in the general public don’t seem to 
 understand is that these migrant workers aren’t taking jobs from American 
 citizens. I’d love to hire local labor, but they simply aren’t available.116
Importantly, this farm owner argues that it is not the way they contribute tax dollars to the 
community that define them as contributing members of society, but the way that they 
form a crucial underclass on which the “real” members of society depend:
 The migrant laborer who comes to work on our farm doesn’t pay taxes, but 
 doesn’t utilize tax-paid services either. But most importantly, what too many 
 people  don’t seem to understand is that these migrant workers allow folks like me 
  stay in business and pay taxes.
All in all, the agricultural shortage illustrates one way in which immigrants do contribute 
to a society, given that the key economic sector of an entire region was threatened by a 
tightening of immigration policy. Perhaps most interestingly for a problem about borders 
and boundaries, the shortages and subsequent economic impacts thereof were not 
confined to the states in which these laws were passed: the entire region of the South, 
from Florida to Virginia, has experienced these workers’ absence as an economic 
detriment.117
 Like immigration status, work should not be used as a simple binary factor, but 
instead as one element in a rich description of how a person has spent their life, what 
roles they occupy in society, and what attachments they have to people and places. To 
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create a thicker description of contribution, Dwyer suggests formulating a taxonomy of 
kinds of work and its diverse moral claims:
 There may be important ethical distinctions, for example, among the following 
 groups: U.S. citizens who lack health insurance, undocumented workers who lack 
 health insurance in spite of working full time, medical visitors who fly to the 
 United States as tourists in order to obtain care at public hospitals, foreign citizens 
 who work abroad for subcontractors of American firms, and foreign citizens who 
 live in impoverished countries. I believe that we—U.S. citizens—have ethical 
 duties in all of these situations, but I see important differences in what these 
 duties demand and how they are to be explained.118
He does not elaborate on a system which takes these distinctions into account. Instead, he 
advocates for awarding healthcare benefits to noncitizens based on their contribution to 
society as employees. Putting value on employment effectively debunks the notion that 
noncitizens are by definition not part of a functioning society because they contribute so 
critically to the labor base. However, it is only one way to define how persons may 
belong to a society, and as a general definition of public membership employment has 
several critical flaws. 
Problems with Employment Status as a Factor for Allocation
 Firstly, the employment-insurance connection has received considerable criticism 
because people may change jobs frequently, and because employers small and large 
suffer from these costs.119 Secondly, many important contributors lack official status of 
employment. O course, there are those working hard under the table, but what about the 
stay-at-home mother, or the great aunt who performs daily childcare for three children 
under the age of four? What about a person who can not find a job, but instead spends 
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more than twenty-five hours a week volunteering at a community organization, such as a 
soup kitchen, a parenting support network, or a library?
 More importantly, using work as a way to determine who deserves benefits would 
exclude from analysis those who can not or should not work, such as children, persons 
with significant physical or cognitive disability, or persons with disabling mental illness. 
While these persons may not be highly valued in the law which establishes American 
immigration priorities, those who have already migrated to the U.S. present challenges to 
policy because of their vulnerability and dependence. Many of these individuals, such as 
children and some disabled adults, probably had no active role in the decision to 
immigrate, so why should they be held accountable for the “crime” committed by those 
on whom they depend?120
 But just how to conceptualize children as members of a public outside of their 
family unit, given their slowly-diminishing dependence on that unit, is opaque and 
largely unexplored in bioethics.121 Outside their family membership, children do not, and 
should not, work. Their vocation is playing, learning, developing their capacities as 
individuals and members of groups. Every child, therefore, represents the possibility of 
contributing goods—economic, social, and cultural—in the hopes, dreams, and potential 
contributions their futures hold. (They also represent all of the detriments eventually 
suffered at the hands of people).
 Because of these uncertainties, I advocate a policy that avoids denying care to 
children and other dependent persons by default, based on their vulnerability. However, 
there may be a time when competing requests for care may need to be adjudicated. Does 
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a child whose parents work have a greater moral claim on life-sustaining treatment than 
one who does not? What about a child who was brought to Connecticut to receive care, 
versus one who has been living here for three years? What about a six-year-old child, 
versus an adult whose intellectual capacity is assessed to be around the age of six? These 
difficult questions make up the hardest work of any person or community attempting to 
define the norms of allocation. To borrow from the approach used by Daniels and Sabin 
(2002), we will largely focus on making a reasonable process—getting the right hands on 
deck—and allow those participating in the process to help refine the set of applicable 
norms.
5. Preference May be Given for Geographical and Historical Proximity
 Thus far, we have framed the dilemma as a problem of competing moral claims, 
and distributive justice and competing moral claims. There appears to be a conflict 
between citizens and non-citizens, but the tension is actually shared amongst members of 
a society who contribute in a variety of ways which go unrecognized in their legal 
immigration status. Two further elements in the story and background deserve attention, 
related to the ethical appeal to proximity.122
 Legal precedents may not define what is the most morally satisfying formulation 
of belonging, but they reflect a fairly broad range of interpretations of what it means to 
establish residence in a community. The Hill-Burton legislation, which obligates any 
hospital receiving reconstruction funds, defines membership in a community by whether 
a person has been “(1) living there with the intention of remaining permanently or for an 
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indefinite period of time; (2) living there for purposes of employment; or, (3) living with 
a family member who lives in the service area.123 By contrast, the state-based durational 
requirements of medicaid mostly bar even legal immigrants from public benefits for five 
years.124
Physical and geographical proximity
 The moral relevance of proximity is typically thought of as a result of physical 
proximity, as in Levinas’ appeal to the ethical primacy of a face-to-face encounter.125 This 
situation translates into a way to judge between competing requests within a system of 
allocation, when two patients differ only in their history of place. For example, A. came 
to us directly from her home country for treatment, whereas a similar patient—let’s call 
her B.—may have lived here for 6 years, attending school in a nearby town, before falling 
ill. She may have done this through a process of legal citizenship, while C. overstayed a 
work visa to become an undocumented resident. 
 Physical proximity in this community does seem to present a kind of claim useful 
for competing requests, but it should not be an exclusionary criteria because of how 
interconnected the world is, despite the norm articulated by strict exclusionary criteria for 
public benefits.126 Upon posing more questions—such as whether patients from countries 
that share borders with the U.S. have a bigger claim than those merely from within the 
Americas? Would a Malaysian person, or an Australian person, be less deserving than a 
Venezuelan, or a Argentinian?—the arbitrariness of distance becomes evident. All in all, 
we may say that the world is indeed flat, but the attachments people make continue to be 
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of strong importance, as are principles such as caring for the vulnerable—since those 
with no roots anywhere may present a unique moral appeal to care.
 As a matter of hospital policy, the institution’s approach to deportation can follow 
along these lines, valuing genuine attachments to a place over administrative or legal 
descriptions of belonging.127 Companies specializing in medical deportations may be 
used only with care and oversight in order to ensure the patient’s safety and access to 
treatment in their home country.
Spending Versus Saving: Proximity of Time
 A second issue of proximity involves a class ethical problem of balancing the 
needs of one real, present person against many theoretical, or future persons.128 Free bed 
funds have operated as endowments, generating interest which can be sustainably applied 
to their cause. But it is fair to keep this money for future persons?
 In 2003, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal sued Yale-New Haven Hospital 
for failing to honor its commitment to charity by “hoarding” the funds earmarked for the 
poor.129 At that time, Yale had been spending around two percent of its free bed funds, 
which totaled nearly $26 million at the time of the lawsuit (see Table 1). By comparison, 
this was significantly below the state averages of that period, which were 2.8-7.8% in the 
three years preceding the lawsuit.130 (In FY 2001, all but one hospital spent in the range 
of zero to 31%; Griffin Hospital was the only one on record to spend 100% of its free bed 
funds, or $251,190, on charity care.) Importantly, these hospitals were also usually 
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eligible for reimbursement of these funds, shifting free bed funds to their general funds 
pool via these reimbursement mechanisms and thereby “bypassing donors wishes.”131
  There are several reasons by spending should be favored over saving. First, 
market gains are uncertain. Secondly, healthcare is a special resource, and money should 
be spent to maximize the health of those living today. Thirdly, spending funds may make 
them scarcer, but spending has the potential to increase awareness of the need for charity 
funds, and potentially encourage donors to benefit the funds at Yale, given the need for 
continual donation. Finally, to justify withholding of therapy in the name of allocation, 
money must be truly scarce, and not theoretically or potentially so.
6. Physicians Should Participate in Allocation Decisions, but Patients’ Own Physicians 
Should Be Advocates and Consultants
 Physicians resist the notion of distributing healthcare because it threatens their 
notion of being advocates only for their patients’ best interests and, in general, of doing 
good in the world. One popular formulation of this argument is that "we should recognize 
no limits, in principle, to the sacrifice that morality can demand of us in promoting the 
overall good."132 Similarly, the oaths endorsed today by many graduating medical 
students tend to endorse this humanist norm with zero interference from competing 
interests: “the health and dignity of my patients will be my first concern.”133
  This position has a variety of benefits: it is simple; it focuses on individual 
dignity, a universal value and the foundation of most systems of ethics; it ignores social 
biases that threaten equity and justice; it is satisfying for clinicians to know that their job 
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is untarnished by other obligations, such as to their employers, guilds, communities, 
systems, or to their own idea of what a patient’s best interests are; it satisfies patients who 
can feel that their best interests are being faithfully represented; and it preserves the 
function of advocacy for physicians, whose myriad responsibilities have made advocacy 
an increasingly difficult task. 
 Writing in a 2005 editorial in the Journal of Trauma, a head trauma surgeon at 
one of the biggest public hospitals in Arizona, a state historically at the center of 
immigrant hospital policy conflicts, appeals to his colleagues about the humanistic duty 
to care:
 I believe it is our duty to recognize the vulnerability of all injured patients in our 
 care and to continually advocate for the provision of excellent treatment. 
 Although JC was an illegal worker in relationship to our state and federal 
 governments, he should be viewed as a legal member of our community. Our 
 moral responsibility is to assure that trauma care is available to all individuals and 
 that a person’s immigration status, the color of his skin, or the foundation of his 
 religious beliefs does not diminish that responsibility.134
This is the ideal that a physician’s chief goal should be to honor the individual 
relationship between themselves and their patient. To maintain this covenant, a physician 
must detach the “ethical” or “professional” issues from the “administrative,” “political” 
or “economic” ones, writes this surgeon-administrator: 
 Indeed, for society, what seems on the surface as an economic issue based on 
 access  and payment of health care truly is an ethical problem based on social 
 justice and societal responsibility.135
His statement balances duty to individual patients with duty to society by adopting 
positions of advocacy in both domains. This is a very appealing position, but one that 
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involves, paradoxically, a distancing of the clinician from his case, because there are 
already financially-based decisions affecting many aspects of the case. 
 Despite this idealization, physicians do occupy a complicated seat in between 
individual and public responsibilities, and in some scholars’ findings, they are already 
participating in significant allocation decisions whether or not they think they are.136 The 
contradiction is illustrated in two professional guidelines from the American College of 
Physicians. In 2004, a working group on managed care ethics wrote definitively that 
“Resource allocation policy should not be made at the bedside,” while a 2012 guideline 
on treatment decisions encouraged physicians to make “parsimonious” choices, in order 
to minimize wasteful spending and maximize justice in the system at large.
 All in all, I believe that physicians as a group should participate in the allocation 
of resources because not doing so would be to decline to sit at the table where these 
decisions are already being made. In general, physicians may bring to the process a 
perspective of moral cognition that is rooted in close proximity to suffering. This very 
bias has been grounds for criticism of physicians’ ability to balance the needs of a patient 
with that of the overall good. However, another way of thinking about this “bias” is that 
physicians’ values and reasoning are rooted deeply in their relationships of care.137 While 
less “rationalistic,” including this perspective may ensure that the vulnerable patient is 
being represented fairly at the table.138
 Ultimately, a patient’s own physician, such as the oncologist for A., should not 
make the actual decision any more than he should sit on the ethics committee when they 
are discussing a conflict in end of life care for one of his patients. It is a conflict of 
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interest, a violation of the patient’s confidence, and of the consultants’ independent 
authority. Furthermore, physicians should be emotionally entwined with their patients in 
a way that would be devastating if they should have to make a reasonable decision not to 
offer one a life-saving, but expensive and unreimbursed, treatment. It is possible that 
serving this dual role would make the least ethical physician (in terms of their allocation 
duties) the most attuned to their patient’s needs, and thus the best advocate.139 
 Ultimately, the consensus of his colleagues, of his hospital, and of the profession 
at large—through professional guidelines that should be established—should unburden a 
physician from actively playing this dual role, even if it occupies her somewhat in her 
heart.140
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IV.  A PO L I C Y F O R  T H E  ALLOCATION OF  CO S T LY 
CH A R I T Y CA R E  AT YA L E-NEW HAV E N  HO S P I TA L
1. STATEMENT OF NEED
 Key missions of Yale-New Haven Hospital include providing health care services 
to all patients regardless of ability to pay, and to provide support, services, and access to 
care within the community at large.141 This mission is consistent with one of the aims of 
the medical profession, which is to support the health of the public and to promote equity 
in healthcare. Some of these services (such as those specified by the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986) are mandated by federal law and reimbursed in 
part by federal and state budget provisions, but much of these services have historically 
been awarded at the discretion of the Hospital through its charity funds—both donations 
made explicitly to cover care for those in need as well as resources that the hospital is 
morally and legally obligated to benefit the underserved and the community at large.
 Because even a relatively resource-rich hospital such as Yale-New Haven does not 
have the financial ability to provide all available services to all patients in need, there is a 
need for 1) a clearly articulated set of principles of allocation of charity care within the 
Hospital and the community it serves, and 2) a transparent process to operationalize these 
principles into practice which governs charity care allocation decisions within the 
hospital.
2. PRINCIPLES AND AIMS
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a. Balancing Responsibilities. The process of resource allocation aims to balance the 
hospital’s obligations to individual patients with its obligation to the community in 
which it makes its home. Individual physicians share this balance of interests, though 
they are primarily advocates for their patients’ best interests. 
b. Requirement for True Scarcity. The hospital must transparently and publicly report its 
charity funds in order to prove the conditions of scarcity that would justify any tragic 
outcomes associated with this policy. Physicians participating in the allocation process 
need to know the details of the hospital’s charity finances, just as an oncologist needs 
to know survival rates to accurately inform patients about possible plans of care, or the 
ethics committee making a futility determination needs to know expected efficacy of 
treatments potentially being withheld, since these statistics are largely the moral 
justification for these serious actions. 
c. Vulnerability and Prejudice. Intolerance has no place in the mission of the hospital or 
the profession of medicine at large. Patients fitting these criteria (i.e. those without 
access to resources or insurance) must be recognized, above all else, to be a severely 
vulnerable and deserving group. Criteria such as race, gender, religious belief, and 
personal values will not qualify nor disqualify any patient from consideration (though 
an investigation of the patient’s social history shall be performed in order to assess for 
their attachments and plans with respect to the community served by this hospital).
d. Federal Immigration Status is an Insufficient Criteria. Immigration status is a poor 
proxy for membership in the community to which this hospital devotes its charity 
mission. Simply denying care to immigrants regardless of their membership in this 
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community would reinforce the state’s interest in controlling the migration of persons, 
and not the goals of the medical profession which include supporting public and 
individual health. Immigration status should be inquired about in the process of 
identifying potential benefits, but it should not play a decisive role in allocation 
decisions, and under no circumstances should this information be used to enhance 
enforcement of immigration laws.
e. Diversity of “Public Belonging.” There is no one definitive definition of “deserving,” 
of “community member,” or even of “resident” which will satisfy all cases brought 
under this policy. Instead, this policy will establish a cased-based approach aimed to 
achieve consensus amongst diverse members of the hospital’s constituency charged 
with determining the allocation of charity funds. By employing a thorough 
biopsychosocial formulation of the person’s medical condition, social situation, 
existing and potential attachments, benefit to the public (i.e. in the case of infectious 
diseases), and consideration of the circumstances that brought the patient to the system, 
cases will be considered individually and comprehensively.
f. Preventing Delays in Care. If patients are already admitted to Yale-New Haven 
Hospital, providers should initiate treatment (i.e. with an initial course of 
chemotherapy, dialysis, or stabilizing treatment in advance of surgery) while this 
process is being carried out in order to minimize risks associated with waiting to 
deliberate. However, patients should not be transferred from other tertiary care 
hospitals to begin treatment under this policy without approval. Beginning treatment 
does not preclude discontinuation should the criteria of this policy be met.
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g. Valuing Spending over Saving. The aims of charity are to help improve the world as we 
know it, not to save up for another world worth improving. The hospital should err 
drastically toward spending charity funds in order to benefit existing patients rather 
than theoretical future ones, even if it is possible in economic or philosophical theory 
to produce more benefit at a later date, since 1) these calculations depend on a not-
insignificant degree of uncertainty in investment return, and 2) the moral claim of 
actual patients outweighs that of future ones. 
h. Patient Responsibilities. All patients should partner with the hospital to accurately 
represent their ability to pay for services. Information used in this proceeding will not 
be provided to federal immigration authorities. However, a payment agreement will not 
be necessary for treatment initiation, should treatment be authorized.
i. Physician participation. The committee is required to have in its constituency at least 
one hospital physician-leader and one physician from each of up to two departments, 
preferably departments involved in the care of the patient (though not clinicians with 
direct care responsibilities). Furthermore, the primary physician responsible for the 
patient being considered for treatment is encouraged to join the proceedings as a 
consultant and patient advocate.
j. Addressing Competing Requests. Competing requests should be prioritized based on 
expected benefit, projected cost, and deservingness with respect to the public directly 
served by the hospital (i.e. long-time residents over those who immigrated for 
treatment). In absence of these criteria, competing requests may be prioritized based on 
a first-in-line method, or expected medical benefit.
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k. Treating Children and other Dependents. Minors and other dependent and 
incapacitated persons should be treated by default. These conditions may not be used 
to potential recipients from one another based on such concepts as innate 
deservingness, societal worth, or utility. 
l. Nonabandonment. Should proposed treatment be withheld, alternatives may be 
considered, and humane alternatives such as palliative care, itself no small expense, are 
always required if none of these should be decided upon.
m.Against Policing the Population. The hospital will always oppose regulation requiring 
reporting of any undocumented immigrants to municipal, state, or federal authorities 
for any punitive purpose. The hospital should not provide patient records, nor records 
of these proceedings, to immigration authorities for the purpose of enforcing 
immigration laws.
n. International Transfer May be Reasonable. It may be reasonable and parsimonious to 
offer international transfer home (or to a country of citizenship) where a roughly 
equivalent treatment is available, so long as a patient or his or her surrogate who 
request or will agree to this service. If no agreement is reached, the hospital will not 
transport patients out of the country against their will unless it is clearly established 
through the procedure outlined in this policy that the patient’s sole attachments in this 
country are the hospital. If no approximately equivalent treatment is available in a 
home country, patients will receive care at YNHH.
o. An Imperfect, Necessary Solution. The problem of uninsured and underinsured 
immigrant persons and citizens without any insurance is not a Hospital problem at its 
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root, but rather a regional, national, and international problem; a political problem; and 
a problem of economics and financing. Nevertheless, the hospital must make clear its 
strategy in navigating these difficult yet inevitable microallocation decisions.
3. ALLOCATION PROCESS
a. A consultation with a charity care subcommittee (defined below) is triggered either 
by initiating an endorsement process or crossing a financial threshold.
i. An endorsement process is reserved for patients in need of services such as 
non-emergent surgeries, transplantation, courses of chemotherapy, or stem cell 
transplantation.Two persons affiliated with the hospital, or one affiliate and one 
member of the public, must endorse a patient for consideration of charity fund 
support for either in-house or—in rare circumstances—outpatient services.
ii. The financial threshold is relevant for patients utilizing, or expecting to utilize 
ongoing services such as dialysis or long-term ventilator therapy who are 
unable to find suitable alternatives to hospital care. All care above $100,000 
may be scrutinized for appropriateness based on the criteria outlined above.
b. A thorough biopsychosocial assessment is required for consideration, in order to 
minimize misapprehension of the facts, and to uncover a patient’s attachments in 
the community. The assessment will be performed by the patient’s primary 
clinician, by any mental health professional (social worker, psychologist, 
psychiatrist), or by a hospital ethics consultant. It should include a comprehensive 
history including the following elements: history of present illness, including 
BLUM 57
history before being admitted (or considered for admission) at Yale, and hospital 
course; social history, including family history back at least one full generation, 
with special attention to places lived and worked; educational and work history; 
and any other relevant data, even if these data are difficult to obtain with high 
reliability. 
c. The charity care committee will be made up of members from hospital leadership, 
hospital ethics committee, and patient services or care coordination. 
i. Hospital representation. The committee must include at least 4 representatives 
of different hospital constituencies, including: 1) Care coordination or finance 
(1 member); 2) clinician leadership (1 member); 3) clinicians, preferably of 
different departments (2 members). 
ii. Patient representation (1 member). Because of these patients’ vulnerability, it is 
critical that they have proper representation with minimal conflict of interests. 
This role may be filled preferably by a lawyer working pro bono or a member 
of a law school immigration law clinic; or, should the patient or her 
representative prefer, by an immigration rights advocate’ or a community 
advocate or representative from community, city, or regional leadership. 
iii.Community Members (0-2 members). Preferably representing constituencies 
not accounted for otherwise (e.g. racial, geographic, and/or socioeconomic 
diversity).
iv.Physician Clinician(s). Participation in the case presentation by a patient’s 
primary clinician is encouraged, but not required. A physician serving any 
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direct clinical capacity for the patient in question may participate as an 
advocate, but should not be present for the committee’s discussions or 
decisions.
v. Family: Family members may choose to address the committee directly, but 
they should observe the aforementioned boundaries outlined for clinicians.
vi.Consensus: Committees must reach a unanimous decision to withhold 
treatment based on the principles discussed above.
vii.Appeal: A patient, family member, or clinician may appeal the committee’s 
decision to the hospital chief-of-staff or his representative.
viii.Transfer: At any point in the process, including after a decision has been 
made, a patient may request transfer to another institution, anywhere in the 
world. If transfer is accepted by the receiving institution, reasonable expenses 
will be shared by both institutions.
4. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
a. Records keeping. The hospital will keep detailed records of all cases deliberated in 
this manner, as well as all charity expenditures during the active fiscal year 
(previous years are already on file with DHS) for use by committee members.
b. Public Engagement. The committee must prepare an annual report with financial 
statistics and the year’s entire history of brief masked case histories for distribution 
to state and federal representatives serving this region of Connecticut, as well as 
the director of Connecticut’s Department of Public Health and Medicaid/Title IXX 
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Programs. The purpose of this communication will be to attempt to bridge the 
profound gap between the actuality of these microallocation decisions as they exist 
in the hospital and as they are represented and insufficiently addressed at the level 
of state and federal reimbursement policy.
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V. CO N C L U S I O N
1. AN IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY SOLUTION
 Ultimately, a charity care allocation policy is not an inspiring moral document in 
the way that the positions of duty articulated by those such as Pellegrino and Thomasma 
are. “The existence of a genuine medical need constitutes a moral claim on those 
equipped to help” inspires; the notion that some people may die because the hospital (and 
we as a public) can’t afford to pay for effective, otherwise available treatment, is utterly 
depressing. It is tempting to focus instead on advocacy in the public domain, or in the 
community at large, the way that some Yale physicians have.142 Why not drop all this 
ratiocination and dedicate oneself to increase the resources on hand by lobbying in 
Congress, or addressing other barriers to care?143 
 The likely truth—admittedly lacking hard evidence to prove that this is the case—
is that these decisions are being and will continue to need to be made, but that they are 
made in quiet.144 Calabresi (1978) has argued that this is so because revealing these 
deliberations to the public gaze would be morally intolerable.145 This feeling was evident 
in the response to the public allocation of renal dialysis performed by the so-called “God 
Squad” in the earliest phase of these treatments’ existence.146 Even though the committee 
included non-clinicians such as ”a lawyer, a minister and a homemaker” in its ranks,147 its 
use of questionable notions of social justice such as “good citizenship” was seen as an 
affront to medicine’s ethos, and the value that the public placed on an impartial healthcare 
profession.148 No consensus, this historical situation would seem to signify, could 
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reasonably stand for the consent of each and every different individual to submit to the 
squad’s formulae.149
 Without returning to the social judgements of the God squad, it is possible to 
adopt a process such as the one I have articulated which will 1) promote transparency of 
resource availability, in order to justify its serious aim; 2) specify and operationalize the 
concept of justice as equity, in order to promote respect for all persons, and especially for 
those with few means and other vulnerable groups;  and 3) allow these decisions to be 
made in view of the profession and of the public at large, in order to promote an honest 
sense of the problem. These aims, I believe, are reasonably satisfied by the process set 
out in Chapter IV. But they are not satisfied perfectly, and the process’ flaws are critical to 
foresee lest this work be used—unintentionally or otherwise—to exacerbate inequity and 
justify bias against noncitizens requiring expensive hospital-based care.
Major Flaws of this Solution
 In general, the policy presented here makes it very difficult by default to decline 
to treat anyone based on a simple notion of membership in the community served by the 
public, even the global community at large. The discussion in chapter III regarding the 
insufficiencies of various legal or administrative ways to define belonging is intended to 
lead readers to the conclusion that there are many ways to belong, or many ways for a 
community to justify wrapping its arms around a person in desperate need—independent 
of their citizenship status, local tax contributions, employment history, and so on. But as 
the shortage of charity dollars decreases (as it is tending to do at Yale and in many places, 
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based on the policy changes described late in Chapter II, and the data illustrated in 
Appendix I), there will be pressure to adjudicate more and more competing moral 
demands on a limited set of resources. This will lead to two major flaws inherent in this 
practical, hospital-based solution I have proposed. 
 One major problem surrounds the complexity inherent in the notion of citizenship, 
and the pragmatic goals of a hospital policy— major points in tension within this work. 
To adjudicate between competing demands—a situation likely to be more prevalent as 
funds run out (see Appendix I, as well as Chapter II)—a committee may need to use 
aspects of the comprehensive biopsychosocial formulation presented in this policy (see 
Chapter IV, item 3b), since it is unlikely that these difficult decisions will be able to be 
made entirely on expected medical benefits or other ways of measuring the non-social 
value of treatment. These psychosocial data were intended to be generated to protect 
these persons from prejudice and misunderstanding; however, they could be come tools 
of care denial. Indeed, this would even be more just, based on the reasoning in Chapter 
III, than a simple determination of legal citizenship status or accounting for taxes 
contributed to the locality. While it would be grossly unethical to apply such criteria as 
race, gender, or socioeconomic status in an allocation scheme,150 some measure of 
citizenship—not legal citizenship, but some way to formulate real citizenship—may be 
warranted as a marker of who belongs to the public which shares some basic 
responsibility for its members well-being. Can a complex notion of citizenship be 
reasonably formulated in this process? If it does, will it satisfy providers’ sense of moral 
distress at the need to make these difficult decisions? Moreover, who would agree to 
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these assessments if they know that they would be used to deny them care? Would a 
person’s consent be valid if they were told that they would only be considered for 
treatment if they spell out their life history? Would psychiatrists and other psychosocial 
professionals generating these formulations be willing to do so, for the express purpose of 
allocation?151
Confusing the Locus of Responsibility
 A second flaw is that this work attempts to strike a pragmatic balance between the 
moral and economic frames of reference, as well as between the individual and public 
responsibilities that physicians, hospitals, and others in scenario all share. It is true that 
these clinical cases are too easily seen as purely economic or legal disagreements, and not 
as moral dilemmas (see pp. 10-12). By taking for granted the conditions of economic 
scarcity which both create the need for an justify the process of allocation, this troubling 
economic frame has been justified somewhat. The key danger is that a fair policy will 
obviate the need to address the root problem here, of economic injustice. 
 Similarly, the hospital policy solution mistakes an international problem for one 
that can be addressed by a hospital alone. But, working at the level of the hospital may 
allow for the kind of nuanced moral reasoning that is simply impossible to perform at the 
level of our national political debates. The kind of nuance that regards the circumstances 
of a person’s immigration as important without fitting these circumstances into rigid 
criteria for or against inclusion in a public insurance plan, as much a barrier to access and 
fairness as the durational requirements of Medicaid have become.
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 These significant problems are probably chief amongst the proposal’s flaws. 
There are several checkpoints in the system that allow reasonable members of the 
hospital constituency to affect the process. For example, whoever writes the psychosocial 
formulation must agree to do so in good professional conscience; consensus must be 
reached unanimously for care to be denied; and this process can not take the place of 
comprehensive care coordination to find other resources in this country and beyond to 
provide the patient with appropriate care.
2. WHO SHOULD PAY?
 The foregoing flaws of this policy’s limited scope are accompanied by one major 
problem: who might bear the costs of this treatment, or even more importantly, who 
should pay for these individuals’ care.  
 Without a sustainable source of funding from the federal governments or from 
private donors, the situation of scarcity will only worsen, and there will be more social 
pressure to exclude noncitizens from healthcare, when everyone is suffering. This may 
further threaten the ability of a hospital to embody the moral norms of the profession of 
medicine rather than of the society at large. 
 The most direct solution would be to promote federal and state policy that 
rewards hospitals for providing charity care. This would be politically preferable 
compared with allocating public benefits to noncitizens, because it would place the moral 
compass in the hands of the hospital itself, who can then define what it means by 
belonging to the public it serves. 
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 However, in absence of these funds—or if the funds were secured but applied 
inconsistently throughout localities or between states, leaving some noncitizens more 
vulnerable to political conscience than others—a mechanism could be used to promote 
allocation between localities within a regional or national network. The comparison to the 
mechanism employed by UNOS is useful here. As a public, non-governmental body, 
UNOS has a national mandate, a broad consensus, and yet some degree of insulation 
from national politics. It has developed a formula to adjudicate between competing 
demands based on time waiting, medical need, and expected utility of the therapy, but 
also uses psychosocial criteria such as ability to cope with and care for the transplant, as 
well as citizenship status itself, in the name of the greater good.152 
 A UNOS-like system of information sharing that preserves the local relevance of 
these problems while promoting a centralized mechanism to connect persons requiring 
various expensive treatments could help to account for hospitals’ charity care 
expenditures and to coordinate for care when a particular locality is unable to meet all its 
constituents’ needs. Free medication programs currently offered by pharmaceutical 
companies could be coordinated through this gateway, along with free treatments 
associated with research protocols and with charitable care.153 This solution would not 
provide sufficient funding for this care—that would have to come from other federal and 
state legislation, from hospitals’ own duties to care for the indigent in their community, 
and from charitable donations from individuals and from corporations—but it would 
provide a way to reach more people and to account for the actual needs of this 
population. By accounting for charitable donations from a variety of constituencies in 
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healthcare the burden of free care could be spread widely not just geographically but in 
the healthcare marketplace. 
Truth or Consequences: Neither Justifies Inaction
 It is possible that firm limits at the level of the hospital may actually change the 
public debate substantially. Currently, it is easy for public policy to assume that a hospital 
will take responsibility for these patients based on the moral duty of the profession. The 
idea that limits can fairly be set may lead, at some point, to a tragic consequence, but it 
may also start a conversation about how to avoid further tragedy that could not exist 
whilst this problem is obscured. My hope is that loss will not be a gross injustice but one 
that has resulted from a reasonable process that, and furthermore, that this loss may 
inspire people to see this issue as one that presents a moral claim to all of us in the 
broader community, to address this issue by taking the notion of charity seriously, and 
seeing to it that limitations are minimized, and all types of deserving persons are cared 
for. 
 However, if this optimism is not justified in reality, this clear, rational process will 
provide members of the hospital constituency a chance to act collectively in these matters 
of injustice. Even without funding support from the federal government, the notion of 
charity is too deeply grounded in medicine and in society at large—even if it is based in a 
strong ambivalence—for no one to at least attempt to fill these gaps through charitable 
donation, or collaboration between providers and institutions in the way I have suggested 
in my analogy to the UNOS system. Bringing these problems to light may indeed cause 
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positive or negative consequences in public policy, but that sphere is less likely to reflect 
the kind of nuanced, social solution to the problem that may be reached locally, however 
in tension these efforts are with federal policy and immigration law.
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APPENDIX I. CONNECTICUT FREE BED FUNDS
YNHH Free Bed 
Funds
Expendit
ures
Total CT 
expend
of total 
CT
DSH 
Payments
Yale 
Exp^
State 
avg.^
FY 2001 36,676,957 680,210 3,319,782 20.5% 28,006,587 1.9% 2.8%
FY 2002 23,524,093 571,215 5,279,746 10.8% 31,009,553 2.4% 5.5%
FY 2003* 25,897,318 541,550 7,900,494 6.9% 23,805,540 2.1% 7.8%
FY 2004 25,977,098 2,622,182 13,043,185 20.1% 24,629,764 10.1% 11.1%
FY 2005 25,977,098 4,721,870 10,933,759 43.2% 17,207,806 18.2% 9.4%
FY 2006 20,187,870 6,893,000 13,492,854 51.1% 26,248,183 34.1% 8.2%
FY 2007 — — — — — — —
FY 2008 16,208,569 3,901,514 — — — 24.1% —
FY 2009 11,321,005 813,615 — — — 7.2% —
FY 2010 9,993,532 834,500 — — — 8.4% —
* Year of Quinton White controversy and AG Blumenthal’s charity fund misuse lawsuit 
was filed in 2003.
^ Hartford Hospital, Connecticut’s second largest charity care provider, which combined 
with Yale provide more than 70% of the average annual charity care, spends, by 
comparison, between 2.5 and 10.7% of its funds on a yearly basis, without the upward 
trend seen in Yale’s figures.
(Sources: Connecticut Health Policy Project; Office of Health Care Access, Connecticut 
Deptartment of Public Health)
BLUM 69
REFERENCES
BLUM 70
(1) U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. Population by Sex, Age, Nativity, and U.S. Citizenship Status: 
2010. http://www.census.gov/population/foreign/files/cps2010/T1.2010.pdf (accessed 15 January 
2012); Immigration and Naturalization Fundamentals. Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/34520.pdf (accessed 11 January 2012); 
Loue, S., Foerstel, J. 1994. Clarifying the legal definition of "undocumented aliens." American 
Journal of Public Health 84: 1032; Wasem, R.E. 2003. 
(2) Passel, J., Cohn, D. 2011. Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 
2010. Pew Hispanic Center. http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-
population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/ (accessed 10 January 2012); González, D. 2009. 
Census concern: Immigrants may avoid the count. The Arizona Republic, 13 April 2009.
(3) Gordon, M. M. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National 
Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 288 pp; Alba, R., Nee, V. 2003. Remaking the 
American Mainstream; Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 384 pp; Reimers, D. M. 1998. Unwelcome strangers: American identity and the 
turn against immigration. New York: Columbia University Press, 199 pp; Chavez, L R. 2008. The 
Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 272 pp.
(4) Donohue DA. 1998. Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirements for Welfare 
Benefits. St. John’s Law Review 72: 451-480; Goldman, D. P, Smith, J. P, Sood, N. 2005. Legal 
Status And Health Insurance Among Immigrants. Health Affairs 24: 1640-1653. For a comparison 
with Great Britain’s National Health Service, see Pollard, A. J., Savalescu, J. 2004. Eligibility of 
overseas visitors and people of uncertain residential status for NHS treatment. BMJ 329: 346-349; 
Mozynsky, P. 2008. No Savings. BMJ 336: 1095.
(5) Cases from within the discourse of bioethics include: Evans, P. 2008. Nonemergency Medical 
Care for Illegal Immigrants in Texas (Commentary). Virtual Mentor 10: 195-200; Coyle, S. 2003 
Ethics Case Study: Providing Care to Undocumented Immigrants. Hospitalist July-Aug: 24–27. 
Many more exist in the popular media, including those archived at “News Round-Up in Brief.” In 
Access Denied: A Conversation on Unauthorized Im/migration and Health (Blog). Eds. Willen, 
S., Castañeda, H., Mulligan, J., Kline, N. Available at http://accessdeniedblog.wordpress.com/
category/news-round-up-in-brief/ (Accessed February 2, 2012).
(6) Berk, M. L., Schur, C. L., Chavez, L. R., Frankel, M. 2000. Health care use among 
undocumented Latino immigrants Health Affairs 19: 51-64; Chavez, L. R., Cornelius, W. A., 
Jones, O. W. 1985. Mexican Immigrants and the Utilization of Health Services: The Case of San 
Diego. Social Science and Medicine 21: 93-102; Chavez, L.R., Flores, E. T., Lopez-Garza, M. 
1992. Undocumented Latin American Immigrants and U.S. Health Services: An Approach to a 
Political Economy of Utilization. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 6: 6–26.
(7) For data from Arizona, see Scheer, N. J. 2003. Keeping the Promise: Financing EMTALA's 
Guarantee of Emergency Medical Care for Undocumented Aliens in Arizona. 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 
1413: 1419f; as well as Petersen, S. R. 2005. Patients Crossing Our Borders: An Ethical or 
Economic Conundrum? Journal of Trauma 59: 1037-1041. For Florida, see Siddharthan, K., 
Alalasundaram, S. 1993. Undocumented Aliens and Uncompensated Care: Whose 
Responsibility? American Journal of Public Health 83: 410-412.
BLUM 71
(8) This split between the “nationalist” perspective and “humanist” one forms the basis for a 
moderate argument in Dwyer, J. 2004. Illegal Immigrants, Health Care and Social Responsibility. 
Hastings Center Report 34: 34-41. 
(9) Deuteronomy 10:19, New American Standard Bible.
(10) “Justice.” In Beauchamp, T. L., Childress, J. 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th 
Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 226-229.
(11) Identifying information, including medical details, have been masked to protect the privacy 
of the patient and family. However, clinicians and hospital staff may be identifiable because of 
the fact that this was indeed a pediatric oncology case at my training hospital. One reason why I 
have chosen to tell this story without obscuring these aspects of the case was that it would lose 
the power lent by concrete details, and by my particular involvement in it, should I make it more 
of an abstract philosophical example. Furthermore, I believe strongly that no one person is liable 
for A.’s delay in getting treatment. The problem was a lack of preparation for the situation, and 
that is why a clear procedure needs to be in place to help guide these decisions. This appears to be 
the norm amongst all the hospitals with whom we have conferred about this subject (Mercurio, 
M. 2012, Feb 1. Personal Communication).
(12) Event-free survival in Burkitt’s lymphoma patients with CNS involvement is 60% at five 
years, compared with 81% for CNS-negative tumors. Salzburg, J., Burkhardt, B., Zimmermann, 
M., et al. 2007. Prevalence, clinical pattern, and outcome of CNS involvement in childhood and 
adolescent non-Hodgkin's lymphoma differ by non-Hodgkin's lymphoma subtype: a Berlin-
Frankfurt-Munster Group Report. Journal of Clinical Oncology 25, pp. 3915-22; and there is a 
30% response rate to bone marrow transplant after disease recurrence. Gross, T. G., Hale, G. A., 
He, W., et al. 2010. Hematopoietic stem cell transplantation for refractory or recurrent non-
Hodgkin lymphoma in children and adolescents. Biology of Blood Marrow Transplant 16: 
223-30. 
(13) What is, or who are, “the hospital?” I take it to be a diverse moral community, a business 
community, a social community, and a professional community, with its own distinct culture and 
ethos compared with the community, but with many connections and responsibilities to the 
community at large.
(14) Wilkinson, J. 1987. Moral distress in nursing practice: experience and effect. Nursing Forum 
23: 16–29; Kälvemark, S., Höglund, A., Hansson, M., et al. 2004. Living with conflicts—ethical 
dilemmas and moral distress in the health care system. Social Sci Med 58: 1075–1084.
(15) There was a sense that legal action would necessarily be counterproductive to our efforts, or 
aimed harshly against the hospital; however, it seems clear, in retrospect, that a lawyer could be a 
valuable consultant about issues of immigration law and an advocate for the patient outside of the 
hospital itself.
(16) Chambers, T. 1999. The Fiction of Bioethics: Cases as Literary Texts. New York: 
Routeledge, 207 pp; Charon, R. 1994. Narrative Contributions to Medical Ethics: Recognition, 
Formulation, Interpretation, and Validation in the Practice of the Ethicist. In A Matter of 
Principle? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics. Ed. DuBose, E. R., Hamel, R., O’Connell, L., J., Eds. 
Trinity Press International, pp. 260-283; Zoloth, L., Charon, R. 2002. Like and Open Book: 
Reliability, Intersubjectivity, and Textuality in Bioethics. In Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative 
in Medical Ethics. Charon, R., Montello, M., Eds. , pp. 21-37.
BLUM 72
(17) Bernstein N., New York Times, 20 Dec 2011, page A1. A similar story, concerning a young 
father, Jesus Navarro, awaiting a transplant at UCSF, was recently publicized in Dreier, H. 2012. 
Support flows in for dying father who is illegal immigrant. Marin Independent Journal, 31 
January 2012. http://www.marinij.com/ci_19863135 (accessed 10 February 2012), and Colliver, 
V. 2012. UCSF still may do Jesus Navarro kidney transplant. San Francisco Chronicle. 10 
February 2012. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/comments/view?f=/c/a/2012/02/09/
BADQ1N2EVP.DTL (accessed 10 February 2012). 
(18) Morgan, S. E., Harrison, T. R., Chewning, L. V., Habib, J. B. 2006. “America’s Angel or 
Thieving Immigrant? Media Coverage, the Santillian Story, and Publicized Ambivalence toward 
Donation and Transplantation. In Wailoo et al., Eds. A Death Retold, p. 19.
(19) Hoffman, B. 2006. Sympathy and Exclusion: Access to Health Care for Undocumented 
Immigrants in the United States. In A Death Retold: Jesica Santillan, the Bungled Transplant, and 
the Paradoxes of Medical Citizenship. Keith Wailoo, Julie Livingston, and Peter Garbaccia, eds. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, pp. 237-254.
(20) Fassin, D. 2005. Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Policies 
in France. Cultural Anthropology 20: 362-387.
(21) This is my memory of the story. 
(22) Bernstein (2011), New York Times.
(23) Organ Procurement and Transplantaiton Network. 2005. Rule 6.0: Transplantation of Non-
resident Aliens. June 24, 2005. Available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/
policies/pdfs/policy_18.pdf (Accessed February 17, 2012); immigration categories and audit 
policies currently being debated and revised, see UNOS Board Further Addresses Transplant 
Tourism (Press Release). UNOS Newsroom, June 26, 2007. Available at http://www.unos.org/
about/index.php?topic=newsroom&article_id=2194 (Accessed 17 February 2012); and OPTN/
UNOS Ethics Committee. 2011. Report to the Board of Directors, June 28-29, 2011. Available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/CommitteeReports/board_main_EthicsCommittee_7_1_2011 
_10_37.pdf (Accessed 17 February 2012).
(24) Mercurio, M. Personal Communication. February 1, 2012.
(25) Felkins J. Hospital boss sees immigration law impacts. Wednesday, October 5, 2011 4:15 
pm. http://times-journal.com/news/article_708b7156-ef97-11e0-aef4-001cc4c002e0.html 
(accessed 5 December 2012). The law is Alabama House Bill 56, the “Hammon-Beason Alabama 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (2011).
(26) An incredible example of this is the Texas teen who was deported to her “home country” of 
Colombia after running away from home and subsequently lying to authorities about her 
nationality. Associated Press. 6 January 2012. Texas Teen Deported To Colombia Could Return to 
US Soon. Fox New Latino. http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/06/texas-teen-
deported-to-colombia-could-return-to-us-soon/ (Accessed 3 February 2012). Another threat to 
civil rights violation associated with enforcement of immigration laws occurs in voting 
identification, e.g.: Savage, C. 2011. Justice Dept. Cites Race in Halting Law Over Voter ID
New York Times, December 23, 2011: page A1.
(27) Hoffman, B. 2006. Sympathy and Exclusion: Access to Health Care for Undocumented 
Immigrants in the United States. In Wailoo, et al., Eds. A Death Retold: Jesica Santillan, the 
bungled transplant, and paradoxes of medical citizenship, pp. 237-254. 
BLUM 73
(28) In each case, a powerful social force was a “third party” which proved to be somewhat 
conflictual for the doctor patient relationship—the notion of science and its conflicts around 
research and progress, and then the 3rd party payer and the public’s money.
(29) American Medical Association, “Original Code of Medical Ethics” (1847). Chicago: AMA 
Press, 1847. Available at www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ethics/1847code.pdf (Accessed 12 
January 2012), p. 105 (italics mine).
(30) ibid.
(31) Starr, P. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books.
(32) AMA (1847), p. 98. 
(33) Ibid., pp. 105-106.
(34) Ibid., p. 104. (“A wealthy physician should not give advice gratis to the affluent; because his 
doing so is an injury to his professional brethren. The office of a physician can never be 
supported as an exclusively beneficent one; and it is defrauding, in some degree, the common 
funds for its support, when fees are dispensed with, which might justly be claimed.”)
(35) Ibid., p. 103.
(36) Ibid., p. 103.
(37) Ibid., p. 84, 105.
(38) American Medical Association. 1957 (2001). Principles of Medical Ethics. http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-
ethics.page (accessed 3 Feb 2012).
(39) American Medical Association. 1994. “9.065: Caring for the Poor.” Code of Medical Ethics. 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/9065a.pdf (Accessed 12 Jan 2012).
(40) It does, however, acknowledge that physicians of affluence should help those working for 
communities of greater need. Opinion 9.065: “In the poorest communities, it may not be possible 
to meet the needs of the indigent for physicians’ services by relying solely on local physicians. 
The local physicians should be able to turn for assistance to their colleagues in prosperous 
communities, particularly those in close proximity” (ibid.).
(41) Ibid.
(42) Snyder, L., and the ACP Ethics, Professionalism, and Human Rights Committee. 2012. 
“Financial Arrangements.” In American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 6th Edition. Annals 
of Internal Medicine 156: 73-104. 
(43) American Academy of Family Physicians. 2007. Policies & Recommendations. http://
www.aafp.org/online/en/home/policy/policies/u/undocindiv.html and http://www.aafp.org/online/
en/home/policy/policies/u/undocumentedpatients.html (Accessed 11 January 2012). While AMA 
members are encouraged to “respect the law,” they should also “recognize a responsibility to seek 
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the patient” (AMA Code 
of Ethics).
(44) Quoted in AMA Code, 9.065. Note that there is no no real mention of immigrant status, or 
any other political controversies that characterize problems in caring for the most politically, and 
often medically. vulnerable persons.
BLUM 74
(45) Starr (1982), p. 153.
(46) Ibid., p. 147.
(47) Young, G. J., Desai, K. R., Lukas, C.V. 1997. Does the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten 
Health of the Poor? Health Affairs 16: 137-141.
(48) Morrisey, M. A., Wedig, G. J., Hassan, M. 1996. Do nonprofit hospitals pay their way? 
Health Affairs 15: 132-144.
(49) Nicholson, S., Pauly, M. V., Burns, L. R., et al. 2000. Measuring community benefits 
provided by for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Health Affairs 19: 168-177.
(50) Burrow, G. N. 2002. A History of Yale's School of Medicine: Passing Torches to Others. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 4. 
(51) Ibid., p. 257.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Ibid.
(54) Hollingsworth, J. R., Hollingsworth, E. J. 1995. Controversy about American Hospitals: 
Funding, Ownership, and Performance. Readings in American Health Care: Current Issues in 
Socio-Historical Perspective. Ed. Rothstein, W. G. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, 
p. 241; Rosenberg, C. E. 1979. Inward Vision and Outward Glance: The Shaping of the American 
Hospital, 1880-1914. Bull of Hist of Med 53: 346-92; Rosner, D. 1982. A Once Charitable 
Enterprise. New York: Cambridge University Press; Stevens, R. 2007. “Sweet Charity: State Aid 
to Hospitals in Penn, 1870-1910.” In The Public-Private Health Care State. pp. 7-25.
(55) Burrow (2002), p. 257-8.
(56) Ibid., p. 258. Now, community advocates speak out for the rights of immigrants to recieve 
charity care, but they remark that many residents believe these persons receive privilege over un- 
or under-insured New Haven Residents, and feel much less sympathetic (Rev. Bonita Grubbs, 
Symposium on “Access to Hospital Care for Foreign Patients in the U.S.” Yale Medical School 
Program for Biomedical Ethics, September 22, 2011).
(57) Ibid., p. 3.
(58) Ibid, p. 2.
(59) Ibid., p. 5.
(60) Ibid., p. 253.
(61) Personal communication with Ms. Ginny Szondy, Care Coordinator for Pediatric Oncology, 
Yale-New Haven Children’s Hospital. 
(62) Lagnado, L. March 13, 2003. Twenty years and still paying—Jeanette White Is Long Dead 
But Her Hospital Bill Lives On; Interest Charges, Legal Fees. Wall St J., at B1. 
(63) Cohen, B. 2006. The Controversy Over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured—No Villains, No 
Heroes. 51 Vill. L. Rev.: 95-151.
(64) Ibid., p. 99.
BLUM 75
(65) Carreyrou, J., Martinez, B. December 18, 2008. Grassley Targets Nonprofit Hospitals on 
Charity Care. Wall Street Journal, page A5; Kane, N. M. 2006-07. Tax-Exempt Hospitals: What Is 
Their Charitable Responsibility and How Should It Be Defined and Reported. 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 
459, and Folkerts, L. L. 2009. Do Nonprofit Hospitals Provide Community Benefit? A Critique of 
the Standards for Proving Deservedness of Federal Tax Exemptions. The Journal of Corporation 
Law 34: 612-640.
(66) Folkerts (2009), p. 615.
(67) Loue, S. 1992. Access to health care and the undocumented alien. Journal of Legal Medicine, 
13: 281-286.
(68) 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1988), quoted in Loue (1992), p. 281 fn70: “[T]he Surgeon General . . . 
shall bygeneral regulation prescribe . . . (f)That thestate plan shall provide for adequate hospital 
facilities for . . . persons unable to pay therefor. Such regulation may require that before approval 
of any application for a hospital or addition to a hospital is recommended by a state agency, 
assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that . . . (2) there will be made 
available in each such hospital or addition to a hospital a reasonable volume of hospital services 
to persons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be made if such requirement is not 
feasible from a financial standpoint.”
(69) Guerrero v. Copper Queen. 1975. Hospital Arizona Supreme Court 112 Ariz. 104 (1975) 537 
P.2d 1329 (Discussed in Hoffman (2006), p. 241).
(70) Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000); 
Krugh, T. D. 1991. The Federal Anti-Dumping Act after five years: a critical analysis of medical 
COBRA. Leg Med: 287-335.
(71) Quoted in Sheer (2003). 
(72) Ibid, p. 1416-17.
(73) EMTALA (1986).
(74) Sheer (2003), p. 1416-17.
(75) Diekema, D. S. 1995. Unwinding the COBRA: New perspectives on EMTALA. Pediatric 
Emergency Care 11: 243-248.
(76) Ibid., p. 243. These distinctions will reemerge in a different form when considering the moral 
claim of proximity (see Chapter III). 
(77) This financial conflict hardly began with EMTALA. In her review of judicial precedents to 
EMTALA, Hoffman (2006) also cites a court case from 1982 which was filed not with a patient 
as plaintiff but by a local private hospital which sued a county hospital for reimbursement when 
the county hospital refused to receive the transfer of a patient.
(78) Immigrant Responsibility and Control Act of 1986. See Sheer (2003), p. 1422.
BLUM 76
(79) The other source of funding has largely been through specific authorization for hospitals to 
receive reimbursement not for individual patients seen but in proportion to the proportion of 
unauthorized immigrants in the community. In 1997, Congress authorized $25 million a year for 
1998-2001 to be distributed amongst the twelve states with the largest populations of 
unauthorized immigrants, and in 2003, $250 million was provided annually for 2005-2008. 
ndividuals” (Section 1011 of the Medicare Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173). 
 A final source of money is funds specifically targets by the Refugee Act of 1980 for 
healthcare costs for applicants for the status of political asylum, originally for the duration of 
three years after immigration but subsequently shortened to four months in January 1990). 
(Siddharthan and Alalasundaram (1993), p. 411.) Hospitals and municipalities have sued the 
federal government many times over unreimbursed care thought to be a result of non-enforcement  
of immigration laws, as reported in Fallek (1996-97).
(80) 104th Congress (1995-1996). H.R. 3734. Park, S. 2004. Substantial Barriers to Health Care 
for Illegal Immigrants. 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J.: 569.
(81) Rector, R. November 23, 2009. Providing Health Care for Illegal Immigrants: Understanding 
the House Health Care Bill. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2345. http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2009/11/providing-health-care-for-illegal-immigrants-understanding-the-house-
health-care-bill#_ftn1 (accessed 11 January 2012).
(82) Luoe (1992), p. 288; see also Donohue, D. A. 1998. 72 St. John's L. Rev. 72: 451-484; 
Siskin, A., Lunder, E. K. 2009. Treatment of Noncitizens in H.R. 3200. Congressional Research 
Service, pp. 6-8.
(83) The key notion that these other budget allocations are in danger in the wake of PPACA 
comes from Burt, R. A. Personal Communication, 13 February 2012. For an overview of the 
budgetary wrangling affecting immigrant coverage in Massachusetts after its universal health 
reform and during the financial crisis, see Tavis, A. C. 2010. Healthcare for All: Ensuring States 
Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants. B.C. L. Rev 51: pp. 1627-1629.
(84) California Health and Safety Code, Part I, Division 1, Chapter 1.3, Section 130 (a)-(d).
(85) Haberman, M. November 28, 2011. Newt Gingrich's embrace of Pete Wilsonism. http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69211.html (accessed 11 January 2012). 
(86) Ziv, T. A., Lo, B. 1995. Denial of care to illegal immigrants. New Eng J Med 332: 1095–109.
(87) Ibid., p. 1095.
(88) Arizona S.B. 1070, Alabama H.B. 56, and Georgia H.B. 87.
(89) In the 1960’s, about 20% survived long after treatment with high-dose alkylating agents 
(Ziegler, J. L. 1981. Burkitt’s Lymphoma. New England Journal of Medicine 305: 735-45). Now 
these numbers are 80-90% with earlier stage disease and 60% after recurrence of CNS-involved 
disease (Salzburg, J., Burkhardt B, Zimmermann M, et al. 2007. Prevalence, clinical pattern, and 
outcome of CNS involvement in childhood and adolescent non-Hodgkin's lymphoma differ by 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma subtype: a Berlin-Frankfurt-Munster Group Report. Journal of Clinical 
Oncology. 25: 3915-22).
(90) Dunleavy K, Pittaluga S, Janik J, et al. 2006. Novel Treatment of Burkitt Lymphoma with 
Dose-Adjusted EPOCH-Rituximab: Preliminary Results Showing Excellent Outcome. ASH 
Annual Meeting Abstracts 108: 2736; Quoted in J Clin Oncol. 26: 2717–2724. 
BLUM 77
(91) Incidence and survival abroad: Hartge P, Wang SS, Bracci PM, et al. 2006. Non-Hodgkin 
lymphoma. In: Schottenfeld D, Fraumeni JF Jr, eds. Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention. New 
York: Oxford University Press; 2006: 898- 918; Ogwang, M. D., Bhatia, K., Biggar, R. J., 
Mbulaiteye, S. M. 2008. Incidence and geographic distribution of endemic Burkitt lymphoma in 
northern Uganda revisited. International Journal of Cancer 123: 2658–2663. For comparison to 
U.S. incidence, Mbulaiteye, S. M., Biggar, R. J., Bhatia, K. 2009. Sporadic childhood Burkitt 
lymphoma incidence in the United States during 1992–2005. Pediatric Blood & Cancer, 53: 366–
370.
(92) Meremikwu1, M M, Ehiri J E, Nkanga D G, et al. 2005. Socioeconomic risk abroad: 
Socioeconomic constraints to effective management of Burkitt's lymphoma in south-eastern 
Nigeria. Tropical Medicine & International Health 10: 92–98; Ziegler JL, Drew WL, Miner RC, 
et al. 1982. Outbreak of Burkitt’s-like lymphoma in homosexual men. Lancet 2: 631–633; 
Magrath, I. 2009.  Lessons from clinical trials in African Burkitt lymphoma. Current Opinion in 
Oncology 21, pp. 462-468. For an even more diffuse social issue: Abandonment of treatment for 
childhood cancer: position statement of a SIOP PODC Working Group. Lancet Oncology 12, pp. 
719-720. Whether these inequalities are true injustices depends on how one defines basic 
determinants of health (see Daniels, N. 2008. “International Health Inequalities: A Concluding 
Challenge.” In Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 333-356). 
(93) Pellegrino, E. and Thomasma, D. C. 1995. Medicine as a moral community. In: Pellegrino 
ED, Thomasma DC. The virtues in medical practice. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 36 
(Quoted in Ziv, T. L. and Lo, B. 1995. New England Journal of Medicine 332, p. 1097).
(94) This comparison was suggested to me by Stephen Bezruchka, Seattle Pediatric Bioethics 
Conference, July 2011. 
(95) This clear example of the potential power and limitations of wealth comes from Mark 
Mercurio (personal communication, 1 February 2012). Hall (1997) makes a rough calculation to 
show how U.S. wealth being insufficient to cover all available services for all people (Hall, M. A. 
1997. Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of Rationing 
Mechanisms. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-5 and fn 1, p. 11.)
(96) This is only one way to break down the public into groups, and, as I hope to show, a poor 
one at that.
(97) There is even evidence that medications have been priced not based on supply and demand, 
but on what “inherent value” they have in extending life as measured by quality-adjusted life year 
cost, employing a cost-effectiveness measure not for the overall efficiency of the system but in 
order to justify a staggering price point based on our collective attitude about extending life. See 
Brock, D. W. 2006. How Much Is More Life Worth? Hastings Center Report 36, pp. 17-19.
(98) Daniels, N. 1979.Daniels (2001).
(99) For example, UNOS factors a range of norms into its distribution mechanism, including the 
norm thought of as urgency of need.
(100) Morrison, R. S., Dietrich, J., Ladwig, S., Quill, T., Sacco, J., Tangeman, J., & Meier, D. E. 
(2011). Palliative Care Consultation Teams Cut Hospital Costs For Medicaid Beneficiaries. 
Health Affairs, 30(3), 454–463. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0929
(101) “When Zeus was informed that Asclepius, the founder of medicine, was "bribed with gold" 
to bring the dead back to life, Zeus struck him dead with a thunderbolt.” Kane, N. M. 2006-07. 
Tax Exempt Hospitals. 51 St. Louis U. L.J.: p. 459.
BLUM 78
(102) Lock, M. 2001. Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death. University 
of California Press.
(103) Daniels and Sabin (2002) make a claim for reasonableness as a key feature of a just 
allocation scheme that lacks the systematic quality of a true theory of justice. (Daniels, N., Sabin, 
J. E. 2002. Setting Limits Fairly: Can We Learn to Share Medical Resources? New York: Oxford 
University Press (Especially Ch. 4, “Accountability for Reasonableness”). 
(104) See Ch. II of the present work, including the brief description on New Haven’s 1833 
cholera outbreak.
(105) Daniels, N. 2008. Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 29-102. This idea clarified for me by Mark Mercurio (Personal 
Communication, February 1, 2012).
(106) A Rawlsian might argue that the policy should be designed under the veil of ignorance, by 
members of the community unaware of what roles they occupy as stakeholders in the process. 
However, this is impossible in practice, as our roles as students, physicians, social workers, 
administrators, and so on are well defined and known beforehand. 
(107) Daniels, N., Sabin, J. E. 2002. “Accountability for Reasonableness” in Setting Limits 
Fairly: Can We Learn to Share Medical Resources? New York: Oxford University Press.
(108) Mark Mercurio, February 1. Personal communication, February 1, 2012.
(109) Dwyer (2004).
(110) (Park (2004), p. 570, Fallek (1997); Kenworthy, N. 2012. The Psychiatric Hospital as Safe 
House?  Strange Asylum for Undocumented Immigrants with Mental Health Needs. Access 
Denied. http://accessdeniedblog.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/the-psychiatric-hospital-as-safe-
house-strange-asylum-for-undocumented-immigrants-with-mental-health-needs-nora-kenworthy/ 
(accessed 2 February 2012).
(111) Kaldjian, L. 2011. Talk from symposium on “Access to Hospital Care for Foreign Patients 
in the U.S.” Yale Medical School Program for Biomedical Ethics, September 22, 2011). Rawls: 
"It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary  that their role in the 
Law of Peoples can not be justified. On the contrary, to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix on the 
wrong thing. In the absence of a world state, there must be boundaries of some kind, which when 
viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical circumstances.” 
Rawls, J. 1999. TheLaw of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 39; Quoted 
in Dwyer (2004).
(112) This argument was first used in Blum, R. Seattle Pediatric Bioethics Conference, July 2011.
(113) Dwyer (2004).
(114) Dwyer (2004).
(115) http://southeastfarmpress.com/orchard-crops/alabamageorgia-laws-impact-florida-labor
(116) http://southeastfarmpress.com/vegetables/farm-labor-laws-crippling-carolina-fruit-
vegetable-operations. Other industries affected include healthcare (http://kuow.org/program.php?
id=25541). Also http://newamericamedia.org/2012/01/future-of-anti-immigrant-state-laws-on-the-
line-for-2012.php.
BLUM 79
(117) $5.5 billion agriculture industry in Alabama alone. http://southeastfarmpress.com/orchard-
crops/alabamageorgia-laws-impact-florida-labor
(118) Dwyer (2004), p. 34.
(119) Blumenthal, D. 2006. Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States — 
Origins and Implications N Engl J Med 355: 82-88.
(120) Chang, C. 2005. Health Care for Undocumented Immigrant Children: Special Members of 
an Underclass; 83 Wash. U. L. Q.: 1271.
(121) Blacksher E. 2008. Children’s health inequalities: Ethical and political challenges to 
seeking social justice. Hastings Center Report 38: 28-35. 
(122) Importance of proximity as a guiding principle comes from Mark Mercurio (Personal 
Communication, 1 Febraury 2011).
(123) Loue (2002), p. 285.
(124) Donohue DA. 1998. Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirements for Welfare 
Benefits. 72 St. John’s Law Review: 451; Siddharthan and Alalasundaram (1993), p. 411.
(125) Levinas, E. 1969. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. by Alphonso Lingis. 
Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 307 pp. 
(126) Donohue DA. 1998. Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirements for Welfare 
Benefits. 72 St. John’s Law Review: 451. 
(127) Nijhawan, Michael. 2005. Deportability, Medicine, and the Law. Anthropology & Medicine 
12 (3):271-285. Petersen (2005) finds that deportation was the most reasonable and humane 
discharge: "The best concentration of resources (clinical, financial, and social) was in Guatemala, 
where JC had the social support of his family and the medical treatment necessary for his 
recovery." See also Dwyer, J. 2009. When The Discharge Plan is Deportation: Hospitals, 
Immigrants, and Social Responsibility. American Journal of Bioethics 23: ii–iv. as well as news 
such as Diamond, M. 2012. Quadriplegic Undocumented Immigrant Dies In Mexico After Being 
Deported From His Hospital Bed. Think Progress Blog, January 6, 2012. Available at http://
thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/01/06/398022/quadriplegic-undocumented-immigrant-dies-in-
mexico-after-being-deported-from-his-hospital-bed/?mobile=nc (accessed 10 February 2012); 
which illustrates how these deportation procedures may lack oversight and may neglect patients 
such as Quelino Jimenez, a 21-year-old man who became quadriplegic after a construction 
accident and who died in a “unequipped” facility in Mexico, and who was deported by a Chicago 
hospital.
(128) McKie, J., Richardson, J. 2003. The Rule of Rescue. Social Science & Medicine 56: 
2407-2419; Daniels, N. 2012. Reasonable Disagreement about Identifed vs. Statistical Victims 
Hastings Center Report 42: 35-45.
(129) Leibenluft, J. February 21, 2003. Hospital sued for $37m bed fund. Yale Daily News. See 
the complaint itself, Blumenthal v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. Hartford Superior Court, 25 
March 2003. http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2003/health/ynh.pdf (accessed 14 Feb 
2012).
BLUM 80
(130) CT Health Policy Project Briefs on “CT Hospital Free Bed Funds,” 2002-06 and 
“Connecticut hospital funds for the uninsured, 2006,” available at http://www.cthealthpolicy.org/
pubs/default.htm (accessed 26 January 2012). Also reports at OHCA, CT DHS. Notably, in the 
bill resulting from his 2007 investigation, Sen. Grassley aimed to have nonprofit hospitals spend 
5% of their revenue on charity care.
(131) CT Health Policy Project Briefs on “CT Hospital Free Bed Funds — FY 2001” 
Policymakers Issue Briefs No. 6, Feb 2003. Available at www.cthealthpolicy.org/briefs/
issue_6_hosp_table.htm (Accessed 26 January, 2012).
(132) Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 1-2, 402-3; quoted in 
Beauchamp & Childress (2001), p. 214.
(133) “A Yale Physician’s Oath” from 2004 Commencement Ceremony Program. http://
info.med.yale.edu/education/osa/milestones/commencement04/program.pdf (Accessed 16 
January 2012). Note the difference between this oath and the ethics of the AMA going back to 
1847, and between the medical school’s graduating ethos and the ambivalent attitude towards 
charity that the Yale medical community has manifested throughout its history (see Chapter II).
(134) Petersen (2005)
(135) Ibid.
(136) Ubel (1999)
(137) Gilligan, C. 1993. Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 216 pp.
(138) This characterization is highly contestable. Veatch (2001) suggestively reports how it seems 
that physicians can harbor secret desires to undermine their patients’ best interests: “The United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) Ethics Committee, when it was debating the principles for 
allocating organs, discovered that the physicians were the defenders of utility maximization and 
the nonphysicians were defenders of equity. Only by a law requiring both does society get 
protected from physicians whose natural inclination is to be utility maximizers.”
(139) Veatch (2001). 
(140) I became convinced of the value of unburdening in conversation with Mark Mercurio 
(Personal Communication, 1 February 2011).
(141) “Our Mission.” Yale-New Haven Hospital Online. Available at www.ynhh.org/about-us/
mission.aspx (accessed 31 January 2012). 
(142) New Haven Register. August 17, 2011. Project Access marks its first year. 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2011/08/17/opinion/doc4e4addf9497d9975134923.txt 
(Accessed 3 February 2012).
BLUM 81
(143) This is a question I ask repeatedly of myself personally, and the direct action resulting in 
this case was strong evidence for why this discourse is important for the patients sake, and also in 
augmenting the model of the physician-patient relationship with a real sense of limits, and with 
the responsibilities owed to the public, the system, the profession, and various other notions of the 
“third” party, which can be obliterated when the physician-patient bond is the only one 
acknowledged. In psychotherapy, this is a real danger to developmental progress in the dyad (see 
Searles, H. 1979. The “Dedicated Physician” in the Field of Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. 
In Countertransference and Related Subjects: Selected Papers. New York: International 
Universities Press, pp. 71-88; and Muller, J. P. 2007. A View from Riggs: Treatment Resistance 
and Patient Authority IV: Why the Pair Needs the Third. J Am Acad Psychoanal Dyn Psychiatry 
35: 21-41). 
 Furthermore, bioethics began as and continues to exist primarily as a field of advocacy, 
even though some argue that it can itself be conflicted with regard to medicine’s powerful forces 
of progress in the domains of science and finance (see Elliott, C. 2002. Throwing a bone to the 
watchdog: Conflicts of interest and bioethics. Hastings Center Report 3: 9 and Lessons in 
Conflict of Interest: The Construction of the Martyrdom of David Healy and The Dilemma of 
Bioethics. The American Journal of Bioethics 5 :W3; or that the field has too little academic 
coherence to be truly unique viewpoint; see Fox, R. C., Swazey, J. P. 2008. Observing Bioethics. 
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 400 pp.) Nevertheless, I believe that bioethics, and more 
specifically, the ethics of the medical profession, has important power to frame this conversation 
in a mixture of medical and social norms. Moreover, it has a clinical power—it has bought its seat 
at the table, in many circumstances—to effect change from within the institutions, rather than 
within academic journals or the press alone. This is the value of my moderate argument as well as 
of clinical ethics as a whole: it helps arrive at consensus fueled by moral norms.
(144) My own personal experience as a patient, student, and in more than three years of ethics 
consultation on two committees is that judgments about deservingness, social utility, and good 
citizenship are not uncommon in clinical dilemmas, including but not limited to pre-listing 
transplantation assessment and intensive care resource allocation.
(145) Calabresi, G. 1978. Tragic Choices. New York: W. W. Norton, 256 pp. This crucial 
reference, and the “God squad” discussion, come directly from suggestions made by Burt, R. 
Personal Communication, 14 February 2012.
(146) Jonson, A. R. 2007. The God Squad and the Origins of Transplantation Ethics and Policy. 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 35: 238-240; Schneiderman, L. J., Jecker, N. S. 1996. 
Should a criminal receive a heart transplant? Medical Justice vs. Societal Justice. Theoretical 
Medicine 17: 33-44.
(147) Lerner, B. H. 2006. Choosing a ‘God Squad,’ When the Mind Has Faded. New York Times. 
August 28, 2006.
(148) Schniederman and Jecker (1996). 
(149) For more on consent to allocation decisions, see Hall, M. A. 1997. “Informed Consent to 
Rationing.” In Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of 
Rationing Mechanisms. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-224.
(150) Criteria such as age and cognitive capacity may be less obvious to sort through.
BLUM 82
(151) An alternative to using any social criteria would seem to be to exclude all social criteria in 
those making an allocation decision, as if constituents of this process can possibly reside behind a 
veil of ignorance. (See Freeman, S. 2012. “Original Position.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring 2012 Edition. Edward N. Zalta, Ed. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2012/entries/original-position/ (accessed Februrary 19, 2012); and Rawls, J. 1999 
[1971]. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) 
However, even a decision of distributive justice constructed in fidelity with Rawls’ intent would 
need to determine who belongs to a public deserving of minimum securities, and what those are. 
The veil of ignorance, therefore, would apply to those making the rules, which is impossible for 
this individual writer or any small team of writers given our stake in the profession and public at 
large, and in our own lives; but it could be an empirical exercise worth performing.
(152) Unfortunately, UNOS employs a quota on transplantation for noncitizens—a quota few 
centers utilize, even as they employ noncitizens disproportionately as organ donors; see Gupta 
2008.
(153) For example, Genentech Access Solutions. Available at http://
www.genentechaccesssolutions.com/portal/site/AS/ (accessed 16 February 2012).
